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Abstract 
This thesis will explore the relationship between political ideology at the Framing and 
how those mentalities transcended time to effect modern economic policies and cause the 
Housing Bubble of the 2000s and subsequent Financial Crisis. This will be done by first 
establishing property rights at the Founding of the nation, narrating government 
intervention throughout American history, and explaining the very government 
intervention which occurred that caused the Great Recession. Finally, this thesis makes 
recommendations to revisit the qualification of the American Dream. 
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Chapter 1: Why the Financial Crisis and the Founders 
 
“I want America to be an ownership society, a society where a life of work becomes a 
retirement of independence.” 
      —President George W. Bush, February 28, 2002 
 
"The political institutions of America, its various soils and climates, opened a certain 
resource to the unfortunate and to the enterprising of every country and insured to them 
the acquisition and free possession of property."  
–Thomas Jefferson, 1775 
  
The most devastating economic event of this generation, the 2008 Financial Crisis 
will undoubtedly influence the political economy for generations to come. 
Unemployment rates soared from 5.3 percent in 2005 to a high of 9.8 percent in 2010 and 
remained above eight percent until 2014.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) steadily 
decreased from 2004 to 2010, and saw its largest drop in 2008 and 2009 when it 
plummeted from 1.1 percent to -4.1 percent.2 The number of foreclosures in the nation 
rose from 801,563 in 2005 to 3,920,418 in 2011, resulting in homeownership rates to fall 
from 69.2 percent to 63.9 percent—lower than they were pre-Housing Bubble (see Figure 
1).3 
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Figure 1 Homeownership Rates, Seasonally Adjusted  
4 
In attempts to unearth the actual foundations of the Crisis, politicians, economists, 
and theorists alike have debated the true source of the economic downturn and a myriad 
of reasons have been proposed. Some blame greedy bankers, some irresponsible 
borrowers and lenders. More still, blame the government, either for its action or inaction 
in the decade and a half leading up to the Crisis and in its aftermath.  
 What most fail to consider is the national ethos that surrounded the home buying 
frenzy that enveloped much of the 1990s and early 2000s. In attempts to create an 
“ownership society,” Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton promoted public policy 
initiatives aimed toward increasing homeownership rates and ensuring that anyone could 
achieve the “American Dream.” 
 The “American Dream” evokes the notions of independence and freedom; 
freedom to achieve upward social mobility and the independence gained of having done 
so by oneself. It is the very fabric of the American identity. With it comes tangible 
acquisitions—material wealth that qualifies the achievement of the Dream. The most 
powerful symbol is the image of a house, usually surrounded by a white picket fence. The 
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idea of homeownership is unique in the American tradition in that it is the only 
universally accepted sign that one has “made it.” While the ownership of possessions 
may appear to be a modern construct, in actuality, the idea of property ownership as the 
qualifying characteristic of American citizenship and belonging is as old as the nation 
itself, and the relationship between property ownership and independence has its roots in 
the Founding.  
 At the nation’s creation, the Framers devised a system of governance to protect 
liberty and property, insisting that the former could not exist without the latter. While the 
concepts of what constitutes property have shifted over time, the idea of having a 
physical stake in the nation and its denotation of full membership into our society has 
perpetuated through time. What followed is an infatuation that this nation and its people 
have with homeownership. 
Politicians do not exist in a vacuum, and like their constituents, are exposed to the 
same cultural ethos that the public is, and are likewise affected by it. The time leading up 
the recent economic crisis was riddled with deregulation and economic practices that 
were all engaged in to appropriate all citizens into the American Dream. Financial 
institutions were encouraged and at times even forced to follow the government’s lead 
and partake in housing initiatives that advocated for equal opportunity in ownership, all 
of which was driven by a national tenet of an ideal society hallmarked by widespread 
property possession.  
The economic practices that caused the financial crisis have their roots in 
mandates from the government, which themselves are entrenched in deep-seated political 
ideologies that were established during the Founding of the nation. Any discussion of the 
financial crisis and the government’s role in it must include this claim. Most theorists, 
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however, do not do this, and limit their evaluation of the causes of the financial crisis to 
that of purely economic practices or governmental legislative efforts. What they do not 
seek to explore is the philosophy behind the government’s efforts to support widespread 
property ownership. This thesis does, and in it contains an examination of the American 
Founding principles of property rights, and how those rights transcended time, creating a 
culture that strove for ownership, which eventually had devastating effects, ironically 
collapsing the housing sector, and bringing down the entire economic system with it.  
The first part of Chapter 2 surveys the literature surrounding homeownership and 
its ties to the American Dream as well as how homeownership has developed through the 
American psyche over time. Here, the importance of homeownership in America are 
established and serve to show how intrinsically tied homeownership is tied to the concept 
of the American Dream. The second part of Chapter 2 gives an overview of the financial 
crisis, as well as defines particular terms and outlines banking mechanics. This section 
works to demonstration the tangible, economic effects that a nation of homeownership 
causes. In Chapter 3, the ideologies of three Framers are explored, specifically their 
beliefs concerning property rights and how they affected the crafting of the American 
governance system. In this chapter, the origins of the importance of property ownership 
are established, and serve as the basis for all analysis of property rights throughout this 
thesis.  
 Chapter 4 details the contention between the theoretical aspirations of a limited 
government in the realm of private property and its practical applications. In it, it 
becomes clear that while the Framers initially sought to limit the government’s intrusion 
on private property, in order to build a nation, and serve the populace, certain allowances 
were given for governmental intervention. What this chapter serves to do is indicate that 
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there is a longstanding institutional legacy of government interference for the sake of 
serving the public good. This tradition perpetuated throughout time, and resulted in the 
government initiatives that caused the Financial Crisis of 2008. Chapter 5 recounts the 
government intervention that caused the Housing Bubble and the subsequent Crisis. This 
chapter explains that the government’s attempts to preserve founding ideologies of 
widespread property ownership had highly negative economic consequences.  
Finally, Chapter 6 postulates a change in the American Dream, and proposes 
different approaches to preventing another financial crisis and alternative means to 
qualifying American Identity.  
 
Chapter 2: A Dream and a Crisis 
The American Dream 
James Trunslow Adams first crafted the term the “American Dream” in 1931 with 
the publication of his book entitled, The Epic of America, where he defined the Dream as,  
a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with 
opportunity for each according to ability or achievement... It is not a dream of 
motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man 
and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are 
innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the 
fortuitous circumstances of birth or position.5 
 
Adams’ ideology is a part of the American philosophy, where, above all, freedom 
of opportunity and prosperity are protected. Amongst these freedoms is the freedom of 
upward social mobility which has called millions to the United States in its nearly two 
and half century existence. These ideas of freedom were not created during the 1930s, 
when Adams wrote his book; however, Adams’ term was a vocalization of longstanding 
principles in the American tradition, namely the protection and promulgation of equality 
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and the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as dictated in the United States 
Declaration of Independence.6 
Today, the Dream encompasses a variety of opportunities and has changed from 
its original inception. The rights to education and healthcare have been enveloped into 
this ideology by both society and the government; however, one of the longest standing 
components of the American Dream has been the right to property ownership. This is an 
ideology that predates the American Founding, to the period of Colonization, when the 
individuals who initially settled in the New World were frequently paid in parcels of land 
that they were expected to cultivate.7 This contract gave way to the idea of the Yeomen 
Farmer, which later became the idolized citizen model in the Jeffersonian perspective.8 
Due to ties of property ownership, specifically the idea of “active property 
ownership”9 which encompassed not only owning land, but working on it for sustenance 
and autonomy, there emerged a relationship between responsible citizenship and property 
ownership. Indeed, when looking at state constitutions of the 13 original Colonies, 
property ownership was a prerequisite for the right to vote in every one.10  
Jefferson in particular relied heavily upon the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
when crafting the American Declaration of Independence. The Virginia Declaration of 
Rights states,  
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.11  
 
It should be noted that the Virginia Declaration of Rights explicitly states that the 
possession and acquisition of property are two fundamental rights to be protected. This 
language is indicative of the government’s responsibility to not only protect the rights of 
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property ownership, but also those of property acquisition, indicating that the 
propertyless still have protected rights in their ability to eventually become property 
owners.  
Due to the inclusion of property rights as a requirement for the right to vote, there 
would appear to be some intrinsic superiority of property owners over non-property 
owners. John Adams postulated that, “Is it not…true that men in general, in every 
society, who are wholly destitute of property, are…too dependent on other men to have a 
will of their own?... Such is the frailty of the human heart, that very few men who have 
no property, have any judgment of their own.” The origins of the virtue of property 
ownership in the American tradition are, by Adams’ own dialogue, rooted in 
independence and freedom, two things that are the very foundation of Americanism and 
were often echoed by Adams’ Revolutionary contemporaries. This ideology became 
wholly ingrained in the American spirit and evolved to be an inherent aspect of what it 
means to be American.  
 Eventually, the ties between property ownership and American identity became 
implicit, with leaders in government, the private, and public sectors advocating for wider 
spread property rights which they argued were inherently American. From the Founding 
to the administrations of modern presidencies, there has been a perpetual call to ensure 
that, “everyone who wants to own a home has got a chance at doing so.”12 
While widespread homeownership has been a longstanding part of the American 
tradition, the push for every American to own a home eventually came with a 
catastrophic price, sending the banking sector into a freefall and led, paradoxically, to 
hundreds of thousands of American eventually losing their homes.  
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Looking at legislation and economic history, many look to pinpoint where exactly 
the turning point in property ownership occurred. In simpler terms: where did it all go 
wrong? Where was the threshold when housing for all Americans became a liability as 
opposed to an achievement of enduring promises set forth by fundamental American 
ideals? To answer this question, we need to look at the course of property ownership, and 
eventual homeownership, throughout the nation’s history. While this is a vast chronicle, 
there are distinct tipping points in its history.  
The Founders did not value property ownership for the mere sake of ownership, 
but rather for its productivity.13 The United States was constructed upon the idea of 
individual ownership of property as means for production, most notably farming. In the 
Colonial Era, owning property was considered a right of the individuals who established 
the Colonies. Indeed, many were paid in land with the expectation that they would 
cultivate it.  
Documentation that chronicles the American Founding notes that the Framers 
believed that every American was entitled to the “means of acquiring and possessing 
property.”14 The Framers were largely influenced by the ideology of John Locke, whose 
ideas about liberty, society, and government are reflected in a myriad of American 
documents such as the Declaration of Independence. Later, in campaigns to promote the 
acceptance of the newly written Constitution, the Founders, in publications such as the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, emphasized the linkages amongst property 
ownership, economic autonomy, and political freedom.15  
James Madison was one such Framer who advocated heavily for the protections 
of private property. In the Federalist Paper #10, of which Madison is generally 
recognized to have authored, he wrote, “The diversity in the faculties of men, from which 
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the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of 
interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.”16 Here he 
notes that the primary intent of an American government must be, above all, the 
protection of property ownership. Madison and other Federalists defined the purpose of 
good government as, “a matter of protecting the rights of both people and property.”17 
While protecting citizens is essentially universal, there is a distinction in regards to 
property. It was thought that those without property couldn’t be relied upon to contribute 
to it preservation.  
Additionally, with legal protection of property, owners of property would have 
enough economic security to challenge those in power. The existence of an abundance of 
owners would then counterbalance an overreaching government. Utilizing this line of 
thought, property ownership was the only way to achieve political freedom. Land 
ownership was imperative for economic independence, and from economic 
independence, came liberty.18  
In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville notes that even the United States’ 
inheritance laws, which distinctly omit the mandate of primogeniture, unlike its English 
counterparts, perpetuated the idea of equality due to the fact that instead of the eldest 
male being the sole recipient of property, theoretically, all children would have an equal 
right to inherit.19 Incidentally, it should be noted that primogeniture was one of Adam 
Smith’s complaints against the property rights in England in the same era. Smith’s 
argument was that primogeniture led to allowing land to “rest,” meaning that the 
development of land was often neglected due to automatic inheritance.20 Thus, the equal 
opportunity of inheritance should be promoted due to the fact that innovative and 
efficient usage of the land was more likely to occur under those new paradigms. Thus, it 
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is clear that the idea of productive property ownership was not unique to the Colonies; 
however, it was a growing sentiment in the political sphere of the Era. Smith’s ideology, 
more notable for its advocacy for Laissez-Faire governance and economics is mirrored in 
the limited government style the Framers established. Indeed, for more than 150 years 
after the nation’s founding, Laissez- Faire economics was the model that the United 
States followed.  
Property Ownership and Engaged Citizenry  
There has been a longstanding linkage between political representation, 
participation, and land ownership. In Colonial America, land ownership was as much a 
part of a person’s character and identity as religion and gender were, and while almost 
every state alleviated its property ownership conditions for Suffrage, the fact remains, 
that it once was a strict requirement.21  
In the period of Confederation, property ownership requirements were relaxed 
and the right to vote became contingent on property taxes or general taxpaying. This 
indicates that ownership was still imperative, stemming from the ideology that ownership 
was equated to “having a stake” in the preservation of property rights, which would mean 
more meaningful civic participation.22  
Even to this day, there are limitations on citizens’ rights to vote based on property 
ownership. In many states, those who are homeless face impediments in exercising their 
rights to vote. Registration requirements vary state to state, but in many of them, 
permanent residency or residency at all is a requirement for voter identification cards.  
Residency is also imperative so that each citizen can be placed in a district where he or 
she may vote for his or her Members of Congress or City Council and a host of other 
elected representatives. While this intuitively makes sense, it does leave out a portion of 
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the populace that is, due to the mechanics of the voting process, barred from exercising 
voting rights due to a lack of property ownership.  
Additionally, Freed slaves were promised “40 acres and a mule” after the end of 
the Civil War.23 The term refers to reforms that were aimed to help integrate formerly 
enslaved African American into society. Due to their continuous work on farms, many 
Freedmen believed that they had a natural right to the land they and their families had 
worked on for generations. Sherman’s Special Field Orders No. 15 declared government 
appropriated land was to be divided into plots of 40 acres and settled by Freedmen for 
their own work and sustainability. These promises were eventually negated when 
President Johnson pardoned Southern landowners and restored their ownership during the 
Reconstruction Era.24 The fact that land was used to aggregate Freedmen into society is 
demonstrative of the importance that property ownership has in American citizenship. 
Instead of promising equitable hiring rights, mandated education, or any other aspects of 
social and economic integration, freed slaves were promised property, something that 
was clearly considered the most imperative in the amalgamation of African Americans 
into the rest of the citizenry.  
 The Diffusion and Commodification of Homeownership 
The Jeffersonian call for widespread property ownership was still heeded 150 
years after its origin. In the 1920s, there was a call by both leaders of government and 
captains of industry to create a wider “diffusion of property ownership.”25  Then 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover stated in a speech to the Academy of Political 
Science Dinner in March of 1925 that,  
one of the continuous and underlying problems of sustained democracy is the 
constant and wider diffusion of property ownership. Indeed, I should become 
fatalistic of ultimate destruction of democracy itself if I believed that the result of 
all of our invention, all of our discovery, all our increasing economic efficiency 
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and all our growing wealth would be toward the further and further concentration 
of ownership.26  
 
The fear of highly concentrated property ownership was not a newly founded fear 
at the time, however it was exacerbated by the recent world war and the economic 
stresses on the European continent. Hoover’s statements reflected the everlasting issue of 
property ownership, that being, that it has continuously been viewed as a tool for the 
citizenry to control its government, and the less people who have that tool, the worse off 
the country is.  
In the inter-war period, riots began due to post-World War I housing shortages, 
prompting Hoover to create his “Own Your Own Home” campaign, which was meant to 
restore political stability by tying workers to a piece of property and a mortgage.27  
During this time, the government broadened the idea of working-class citizenship to 
include homeownership and enacted legislation to make housing more widely available 
to citizens in conjunction with this campaign.28 It was eventually due to the civil unrest 
caused by the disparity in homeownership during inter- and post-war eras that prompted 
more relaxed regulations for homeownership, the most notable being the Housing Acts of  
1934 and 1949.29  
In 1934, one of the most impactful pieces of New Deal legislation was passed—
the National Housing Act of 1934, which created the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). 
The FHA established and guaranteed the amortized mortgage and developed insurance, 
property, and financing standards.30 The FHA also oversaw the materials used in FHA-
approved houses which, from 1934 to1957, accounted for about 30 percent of all homes 
built in the country. The government thusly oversaw the process of consumption and 
production, thereby allowing the full commodification of the housing industry. Due to the 
increased ease of buying and selling property, “an ethos of trading up to bigger, more 
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expensive houses” was created.31 Restructured mortgage lending policies made houses 
easier to pay for, and housing became not only a commodity, but an affordable one.32  
In President Truman’s own words, the Housing Act of 1949, “establishes as a 
national objective the achievement as soon as feasible of a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family… These policies are thoroughly consistent 
with American ideals and traditions.”33  
The Act was a part of President Truman’s Fair Deal program, and extension of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, as well as a fulfillment of a promise 
made in his State of the Union address. The plan increased the federal government’s role 
in mortgage insurance and the construction of public housing. The Act provided federal 
financing for slum clearing as a part of urban renewal projects, increased FHA mortgage 
insurance, used federal money to buy more than 800,000 housing units, funded research 
for housing and housing techniques, and allowed the FHA to provided financing for 
homeowners in rural areas.  The act also delegated to Congress the task of creating low-
rent public housing, increasing units to one million over the following seven years.34 
 Considered one of the greatest pieces of legislation in the 20th century, scholars 
note that it achieved one of the greatest goals of the 20th century, that is, the 
democratization of homeownership. The goals of the Act, however, took over two 
decades to be finally realized, and during its initial stages, the Housing Act displaced 
lower-income families and helped propagate the deeply seated racism of the time. In fact, 
cities’ segregation was made more pronounced during the initial stages of is 
implementation due to the fact that most people who fell into the low income bracket 
were minorities. The displacement of these groups resulted in heavily concentrated areas 
populated by predominantly African American tenants, and those racially segregated 
	  13 
	  
neighborhoods remained for decades, some even until today. These faults were somewhat 
remedied when the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 were passed. Both pieces of legislation realized the Civil Rights Movement’s 
goals of equitable housing. Although amended and reincarnated for decades after its 
initial passage, the initial Act remain one of the most fundamental and revolutionary 
housing initiatives in American history.35 
Private and public sectors alike were concerned with the growing concentration of 
wealth in the United States. Not only from an economic viewpoint but also a social 
standpoint, with the common manner of thinking being that the growing middle class 
would become revolutionary (in a manner not unlike the American Independence 
movement) if they did not have a stake in the future of its nation. The solution to that 
concern was a higher diffusion of property ownership amongst members of the middle 
class. Secretary Hoover pushed for that property to be literal property, working to make 
possible higher homeownership rates in the inter-war period. He reasoned, in many 
writings and speeches, that if homeownership increased, people would have a higher 
stake in the future of the country due to the fact that they now tangibly owned some of it. 
This would cause greater discourse and participation, and generally make individuals 
better citizens. 36  
Both the private and public sectors heeded the government’s call for increased 
homeownership. The increase in homeownership, however, eventually led to the point 
where mentalities concerning ownership changed. At this point, houses became 
commodified and viewed by the populace as a good, and not just an achievement of 
American ideals. In his essay, “Framing the American Dream,” David Monteyne 
discussed the standardization of architectural framing and how it hallmarked the 
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increased commodification of housing in the United States. The author notes that the 
perpetuation of the American Dream in pre-, inter-, and post-war eras created “over-the-
counter” homes and the Ford-like manufacturing of houses helped actualize what he 
called a “Fordist Republic of dependent consumers.”37 
In the 1920s, houses were built utilizing high specialization which allowed homes 
to be built using construction methods not unlike those of Ford’s Model-T cars. The rise 
of the subdivision saw the ascent of what was called the “minimum house,” houses that 
were identically designed and quickly produced to meet the demand of growing 
homeownership.38 The ready-cut industry that emerged in the 19th century consisted of 
catalogs of homes with fixed prices, making houses much like any other commodity. 
Akin to picking out clothing, one could pick out a home. Sears Roebuck was one retailer 
that sold clothing, appliances, and also homes leading to, “the increase in the 
commodification of the house” which, “largely eliminated the home’s symbolic function 
as a family heirloom or any sense of it as a life-time purchase.”39 This is the time that 
individuals shifted from being homeowners to “home marketeers” and began thinking of 
houses as any other commodity, establishing new beliefs that devalued homeownership 
morally while increasing its value as an investment, much like stock in a company.   
Ethical Homeownership 
The increase in “house marketeering” and its prevalence in American 
homeownership gave rise to the discussion of ethical homeownership—its meaning, 
importance, and relevance in society and history, as well as its impact on the economy.  
The idea of ethical homeownership has persisted through history, with political 
theorists discussing the morals of homeownership. In the light of the recent economic 
downturn, retrospective thinking has led many to view owning a home as not just a 
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financial investment, where houses are seen as assets and wells of credit, but as moral 
contracts, where mortgages are seen as a fulfillment of a commitment.  
Some political theorist make a distinction between moral homeownership and 
commodified homeownership and it would appear that the mentalities that perpetuated 
the financial crisis are rooted in the widespread exhibition of the latter. The distinction 
between moral homeownership and commodified homeownership lies in the usage of the 
house. Moral homeownership is typified in the usage of a home as a place of living, a 
place to cultivate one’s life. Commodified homeownership is the usage of a home to 
make a profit, or for mere financial reasons such as investment. The switch in the 
prevalent ideology from moral homeownership to commodified ownership is the juncture 
where the government’s push of making homeownership more affordable and attainable 
began doing more harm than good, and the harm it caused eventually led to large-scale 
speculation, a housing bubble, and later, collapse of the housing market which was one of 
the primary causes of the 2008 financial crisis.40 
Avramenko and Boyd laid out a series of “sub-prime” virtues that they believe, if 
encouraged by the public and private sectors alike, will not only improve the housing 
markets, but will also produce a series of positive externalities that will in turn generate 
higher social benefits. In describing what they call “subprime virtues” the authors cite 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel, who the authors believe share the idea that, “political 
communities have an obligation to foster a set of prime…virtues among the citizenry and 
to actively propagate shared visions of the good.”41 They mean that the government has a 
responsibility to guide the public’s morals in order to sustain public good and civic 
identity.  
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 If “politics creates policies, policies also remake politics” the symbiotic 
relationship between politics and policies can most readily be seen in the various pieces 
of housing legislation from the Founding, to the Civil War, the Post-War Era, the Civil 
Rights Era, and finally to the housing initiatives in the 2000s.42 Andrea Louise Campbell 
stated that “government policy fundamentally transforms its target population,” meaning 
that potential housing policies and initiatives have the power to influence the citizenry’s 
actions.43 While this may seem intuitive, this can mean that certain allowances that the 
government makes may encourage behavior that citizens may not have otherwise 
engaged in. All of a sudden, if something is legal, or better yet, encouraged by the 
government through subsidies or credits, people who otherwise would not partake in 
activities would, due to the incentives.  
Similarly, housing policy can be a tool for instructing or discouraging certain 
civic virtues. The policies of the 20th century that were intended to bring homeownership 
to all Americans caused consequences that were not only damaging economically but 
detrimental to the morals of the populace. Avramenko and Boyd go on to state that 
instead of promoting homeownership, housing polices encouraged house flipping and the 
retraction of morals from homeownership.44   
Looking Forward 
The “ownership society” is integral in the American identity.45 While it does 
pertain to homeownership, the idea of homeownership is more than just the tangible 
aspect of owning property; it is the act of consciously putting down roots and engaging in 
the surrounding community. While there is little debate over the existence of an intrinsic 
relationship between homeownership and the American identity, this thesis argues that 
that relationship, the perpetuation of the so-called “American Dream,” has negatively 
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affected the American psyche, resulting in governmental action, and also inaction, that 
allowed a housing bubble to develop which eventually burst and led to the Financial 
Crisis of 2008. It is still quite obvious that the idea of homeownership for all, even after 
the Crisis, is very much a part of the American ethos, but how the government, private 
sector, and the American citizenry reconcile this ethos with the reality of a recovering 
economy will remain to be seen.   
A Crisis 
 In September of 2008, Lehman Brothers, the American-based global investment 
firm, filed for bankruptcy. In what was to become the largest economic crisis since the 
Great Depression in the 1930s, the closing of Lehman Brothers was the beginning of a 
series of collapses that plagued the Great Recession. After nearly two decades of 
industrial growth, record-breaking trading, and a housing market boom that seemed 
unstoppable, the sudden economic decline starkly contrasted with the fervent success of 
the previous 20 years.  
 The housing boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s profoundly shifted the way 
in which the banking industry operated, that much is certain. A less obvious, but equally 
important change that occurred was the way in which individuals viewed themselves and 
others in relation to the economy. Richard Shiller stated that,  
That boom involved a transformation of people’s thinking about their role in the 
economy. The idea developed that we ought to expect to make a lot of money 
investing. The transformation went well beyond opinions about particular 
investment strategies to alter the very self-esteem mechanism that supports our 
egos. The Protestant work ethic that had underlain the national psyche for so long 
underwent a makeover. To a substantial extent, we no longer admired those who 
were merely hard workers. To be truly revered, one had to be a smart investor as 
well.46  
 
Shiller succinctly sums up one of the less tangible, but nonetheless essential outcomes of 
the financial crisis: a change in society’s psyche.  
	  18 
	  
Trying to figure out how we got to this economic state takes more than looking at 
big banks and blaming irresponsible lending. Indeed, there is more to this story, which 
was, in fact, decades in the making. Looking at public policies that created the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), as well as international statues and the perfect storm of 
aggressive mortgage lenders and ignorant borrowers, it is obvious that the housing 
bubble, its burst, and the ensuing financial crisis is a complex narrative that encompasses 
both political and economic agendas.47   
 Housing prices and homeownership began to increase in the mid-1990s, and the 
boom continued until 2006 when prices began their rapid decline. Purchases of real 
estate, for the prior decade and a half, had appeared to be a sound investment that could 
provide financial security and even a path to greater wealth. Looking at Table 1, the 
United States Census Bureau reported that homeownership rates rose five percent in the 
decade between 1994 and 2004. The national homeownership rate had remained level at 
64 percent since the 1970s, and this sudden increase in a relatively short time span 
constituted unparalleled growth. 
The increase in homeownership rose especially for minority homeowners under 
the age of 35. From 1995 to 2006, homeownership rates for African Americans rose from 
42.7 percent to 47.9 percent while the rates rose from 42.1 percent to 49.7 percent for 
Hispanics which constitutes the largest increase in homeownership rates for any 
demographic.   
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1994 1995 1996\1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002\r1
U.S. total..............................................................………….. 64.0 64.7 65.4 65.7 66.3 66.8 67.4 67.8 67.9 67.9
..White, total.........................................................…………. 67.7 68.7 69.1 69.3 70.0 70.5 71.1 71.6 71.8 71.7
….Non-Hispanic White …………......................................... 70.0 70.9 71.7 72.0 72.6 73.2 73.8 74.3 74.5 74.7
..Black, total.........................................................…………... 42.3 42.7 44.1 44.8 45.6 46.3 47.2 47.7 47.3 47.4
..All Other Races, total..........................................……………… 47.7 47.2 51.0 52.5 53.0 53.7 53.5 54.2 54.7 54.5
…...American Indian or Alaskan Native………………………. 51.7 55.8 51.6 51.7 54.3 56.1 56.2 55.4 54.6 54.0
…...Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander………………............................51 3 50.8 50.8 52.8 52.6 53.1 52.8 53.9 54.7 54.6
…...Other.................................................................... 36.1 37.4 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
..Hispanic or Latino.................................................... 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 44.7 45.5 46.3 47.3 48.2 47.0
..Non-Hispanic.....................................................………….. 65.9 66.7 67.4 67.8 68.3 68.9 69.5 69.9 70.0 70.2
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
U.S. total...........................................................……….. 68.3 69.0 68.9 68.8 68.1 67.8 67.4 66.9 66.1 65.4
..White alone, total............................................................ 72.1 72.8 72.7 72.6 72.0 71.7 71.4 71.0 70.3 69.8
….Non-Hispanic White alone........................................ 75.4 76.0 75.8 75.8 75.2 75.0 74.8 74.4 73.8 73.5
..Black alone, total............................................................ 48.1 49.1 48.2 47.9 47.2 47.4 46.2 45.4 44.9 43.9
..All Other Races alone, total\2............................................. 56.0 58.6 59.2 59.9 59.2 58.5 57.8 57.0 56.4 55.0
…...American Indian or Alaskan Native alone...………….. 54.3 55.6 58.2 58.2 56.9 56.5 56.2 52.3 53.5 51.1
…...Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander alone............................56 3 59.8 60.1 60.8 60.0 59.5 59.3 58.9 58.0 56.6
..Hispanic or Latino.................................................... 46.7 48.1 49.5 49.7 49.7 49.1 48.4 47.5 46.9 46.1
..Non-Hispanic.......................................................………….. 70.8 71.5 71.2 71.2 70.5 70.3 69.8 69.4 68.7 68.2
2013
U.S. total...........................................................……….. 65.1
..White alone, total............................................................ 69.6
….Non-Hispanic White alone........................................ 73.3
..Black alone, total............................................................ 43.1
..All Other Races alone, total\2............................................. 55.1
…...American Indian or Alaskan Native alone...………….. 51.0
…...Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander alone............................57 4
..Hispanic or Latino.................................................... 46.1
..Non-Hispanic.......................................................………….. 67.9
Footnotes:
NA Not Applicable.
\1 Beginning in 1996 to 2002, those answering 'other' for race were allocated to one of the 4 race categories--
White, Black, American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo (one category), or Asian or Native Hawaiian.
\2 Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, Americn Indian or Alaska Native (only one race reported) and Two or more races.
\r1 Revised based on the 2000 Census.
Table 1: Homeownership Rates 1994-2012, By Race 
Source: Table 22. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of Householder: 1994 to 
 2013." Census.gov. United States Census Bureau, 7 Mar. 2014. Web. 1 Apr. 2015. 
 <http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtab16.xls>. 
 
This increase was the realization of nearly a century’s worth of public policy 
initiatives that sought to democratize homeownership and allow for more citizens to 
achieve the widely perpetuated idea of the “American Dream.” The Dream, which 
envelops a sentiment of property ownership as a part of overall citizenry, is the 
longstanding ideology about what it means to be American, and conveys a sense of 
belonging to the greater society. High homeownership rates are beneficial to society, that 
cannot be denied; new construction of homes positively contributes to GDP but also 
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otherwise contributes to areas due to increased investments in local communities and 
indicates the much sought-after achievement of upward mobility that the nation’s 
political ideology is built upon. The one aspect of increased homeownership that is often 
times difficult to recognize is that homeownership is not, as Robert Shiller puts it, “the 
ideal housing arrangement for all people in all circumstances.”48 In retrospect, Shiller’s 
statement is acutely accurate. 
Last Time 
During the last housing crisis in 1925-1933, home prices fell over 30% and 
unemployment rose to roughly 25%. To mitigate the effects of Great Depression, 
President Franklin Roosevelt installed a series of work programs as well as banking 
reforms and housing initiatives in his New Deal. In the time directly preceding the Great 
Depression, most borrowers took out mortgages that spanned five years or less which 
they would then expect to roll over before their contracts were due. As the Great 
Depression took hold, new homeowners found themselves unable to refinance their 
homes, which about 30% of them eventually lost.49  
In 1933, at the end of President Hoover’s administration, Congress enacted a new 
bankruptcy law which allowed for average citizens to accept bankruptcy protection. 
When Roosevelt took office, he signed off on the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), which lent to local home financial institutions and took on risky mortgages as 
collateral, thus creating a government subsidy of homeownership. With that, however, 
the HOLC mandated that new mortgages all be backed using a 15-year time frame and 
that they were both fixed-rate and self-amortizing. This meant that they were paid off 
steadily via monthly payments and that there were not large payments due at the maturity 
of the contract.50  
	  21 
	  
The FHA perpetuated the HOLC mandates by increasing mortgage time frames to 
20 years. These mortgages were also fixed-rate and self-amortizing and eventually the 
time frame was expanded to the standard 30-year mortgage. The 30-year expansion was 
due to the mortgage holders’ need to ensure that monthly payments would be manageable 
for homebuyers. Thus, instead of higher monthly payments for shorter time spans, lower 
payments over a longer time span meant that homebuyers were more likely to honor their 
mortgages and less likely to default.51  
 The 2008 Financial Crisis: An Overview 
This financial crisis was a result of government action and inaction, a 
consequence of policy failures and misconstrued policy goals. The debate that economists 
argue over is whether the Crisis is an effect of capitalism or governmental policy. Since 
capitalism is given necessary constraints by the government, the Crisis is then, a failure 
of politics, facilitated by political initiatives that caused financial ruin.52  
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble was the direct cause of the 
financial sector downfall, that much has been definitively established.53 Subprime lending 
practices, however, are only one part of the narrative. The financial sector encompasses 
the banking sector, thus, it is imperative, then, that any explanation of the Crisis explore 
the relationship between the banking sector and the housing market.54 That is the way in 
which we can also explain how the housing market brought down the “real” economy of 
the world, that is, the nonfinancial economy encompassing businesses and all other types 
of industry.55   
What is imperative to remember, however, was the establishment of the subprime 
markets and the issuing of subprime loans was incentivized and accomplished in order to 
fulfill a highly important public policy goal: the democratization of finance. The 
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democratization of finance and more specifically, homeownership has already been 
discussed from a public policy perspective. From an economic perspective, however, 
Shiller notes its value and states that, “the democratizing of finance is crucial in this 
process: by spreading risk, it places economic life on a firmer foundation. Financial 
democracy is thus not only an end in itself, but a means to another, equally worthy, end: 
the propagation of greater economic stability and prosperity by financial means.”56 
Looking at decades of public policy goals regarding increased homeownership, from the 
New Deal to the Civil Rights Act, the formation of the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), 
to the Fair Housing Initiatives Programs propagated by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), wider spread homeownership has been a goal of the United 
States government since the Great Depression. Owning a home, especially in the post-
War era, is seen as the realization of the American Dream, the fulfillment of a promise of 
economic upward mobility, an ideology that has drawn waves of immigrants to this 
nation for nearly a century and a half. What came after this democratization was, of 
course, increased ownership, however, through the practices of subprime lending and 
securitization that resulted in an increased amount of risk in the market.57  
Government Action  
Three specific government acts caused the creation of the housing bubble and the 
Crisis: the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the establishment of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), initially 
enacted in 1977, was passed largely in order to rectify the inherent racism present in 
previous housing initiatives. The Act mandated that all commercial banks that were 
FDIC-insured mortgage lending institutions make concerted efforts to aid the poorest 
members of the surrounding communities. The government-sponsored enterprises 
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(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created by Congress for the purpose of 
repurchasing mortgages from commercial banks so that banks would be more willing to 
issue new mortgages, which increased their liquidity, thus, spreading the opportunity of 
homeownership to more people. Fannie and Freddie then would package and pool the 
mortgages they bought and sell them to institutional investors in the form of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS).58 MBS are asset-backed bonds. A bond is essentially a promise 
to pay the holder a certain amount of interest as well as the principal over a period of 
time. An MBS is an asset-backed bond where the source of the interest payment is not, as 
with other bonds, a government or a corporation, but a pool of assets, in this case, 
mortgages.59 
 These assets were then given the highest of ratings, AAA, from the three rating 
agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s, thus implying that the MBS were 
investments of minimal risk. It was later discovered, however, in the very midst of the 
Crisis, that the three agencies’ ratings were misplaced, due to oversights and 
miscalculations.60  
Eventually, it wasn’t just investment banks that purchased these assets. Mortgage 
companies, finance companies, as well as insurance companies and pension funds began 
to invest in these assets, which were all backed by mortgages, and many millions of 
which were insured by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The GSEs guaranteed the payments 
of these mortgages regardless of whether or not the mortgagers defaulted, thus, acting as 
a type of insurer for these assets. These assets that were securitized by the GSEs appeared 
to be, at any rate, a sound investment. The Congressional charters of both Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae indicated that if they were to reach insolvency, the federal government 
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was obligated to bail them out. Indeed, this is what happened in early September of 
2008.61  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were both proscribed from purchasing subprime 
loans. So then why mention them? The GSEs insured what are called, “high loan-to-value 
loans” and were designed to help low-income borrowers who did not have consistent 
employment and thus lower credit scores. Loan-to-value (LTVs) ratio is the name given 
to the proportion of the down payment paid in relation to the cost of a house. Traditional 
mortgages, pre-bubble, had required 20 percent down, which meant that they held LTVs 
of 80. Low LTVs were considered much safer contracts, however high LTVs made 
housing more affordable by eliminating large, if any, down payments from the home 
owning process. The average LTV of subprime loans issued in 2006 was 95, meaning, 
that homebuyers only had to put down 5 percent. By that time, high LTV loans had also 
extended to Alt-A borrowers, who were borrowers who had slightly better than subprime 
credit scores but were slightly under the criteria for “prime” loans or whose income or 
assets were under-documented. In 2006, the average Alt-A LTV was 89.62  
In the year 2000, the Department of Housing and Urban Development mandated 
that the GSEs’ low-income goals reach 50%.  In response, Fannie Mae began its 
“American Dream Commitment” program which would span ten-years and offer roughly 
$2 billion dollar in aid to first time homebuyers. Freddie Mac launched its “Catch the 
Dream” initiative two years later that was started to fulfill a similar goal. In 2004, HUD 
increased the GSEs’ goals to 56% and by 2006, 40% of all subprime loans were 
eventually guaranteed by GSEs. 63 
The problem then, was in 2006 when housing prices and values began a rapid 
decline and mortgage payments began to increase due to teaser introductory rate periods 
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ending. Subprime mortgage holders began defaulting on their homes at much higher than 
anticipated rates and by September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were bailed out 
by the government. A week later, Lehman Brothers declared insolvency and it, too, had 
financed a substantial amount of consumer debt, including housing, and the perceived 
irresponsibility of Lehman’s practices made it an unworthy candidate for a rescue. 64 
How the Housing Crisis turned into the Financial Crisis 
While MBS were the securities that were issued by GSEs, private investment 
firms such as Lehman Brothers, replicated GSE securitization and their MBS were called 
private-label MBS (PLMBS).65 The primary difference between an MBS and a PLMBS 
is that the former had the backing of the United States government while the latter did 
not.  By January of 2007, the cost of insuring PLMBS had risen to the point where doubts 
were being raised about the inherent risk of financing them. Due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the value of MBS, banks stagnated their lending in case they needed the 
reserves to pay depositors. This caused commercial banks to slow their lending to 
businesses. This decline in lending is what is generally considered to be the cause of the 
greater financial crisis, herein called the Great Recession.66  
The attraction of these bonds for investors is initially obvious due to the rapid 
appreciation of housing. As the price of a house increases, the LTV ratio decreases. For 
instance, a 20 percent down mortgage which has an LTV of 80 could go down to 73 
without any principal payments by the mortgagor if the price of their home increased by 
ten percent because the value (V) increases while the loan (L) remains constant . 
Inversely, an LTV of 100 (meaning no down payment) would be pushed down to 80 LTV 
if there was a 25% increase in the price of the home. Thus, merely riding the boom 
through ensured a payout on investment even without any larger down payments.   
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Retrospectively, it is easy to see the risk involved with relying on housing prices 
to increase and thus superficially reduce the risk on subprime mortgages. In the fervor of 
the housing boom, however, when prices seemed as if they would only ever increase, this 
risk seemed negligible. Both bankers and mortgagors were so sure that housing would 
only appreciate, in fact, that second mortgages were issued in the form of home-equity 
loans, home equity lines of credit, and “cash-out refinancing” which all increased the 
mortgages of the houses which acted as collateral. These mechanisms, however, could 
only be used if the prices of homes rose proportionately, which of course, they were 
expected to.   
Some believe that the cause of the Crisis was a lack of liquidity, meaning that 
banks stopped lending due to the fact that they simply did not have the cash on hand. 
Banks stopped interbank lending not because they did not have the cash on hand, it was 
because each bank feared that any potential borrower wouldn’t be able to pay back the 
interbank loan. Due to the uncertainty regarding which banks held which assets, 
specifically which banks were holding subprime mortgages-backed assets, and the 
uncertainty surrounding how toxic these assets would actually turn out to be, the glut in 
lending then, resulted from wild uncertainty in the banking industry, not a lack of capital 
of individual banks.  
The worry that commercial banks held regarding their competitors’ solvency 
mirrored the fear that they had for their own solvency. Because holdings of MBS had 
uncertain value, banks could not be sure of their own risk, much less the risk that other 
banks faced, even the ones to which they had lent money. The world’s commercial banks 
had made up about half of all investments in PLMBS, as well as more than $852 billion 
in agency MBS.67 The decline in the value of these securities forced banks to contract 
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their lending into the “real economy” of consumers starting in mid-2007.68  The economy 
relies on commercial banks to lend to consumers and businesses, which for this 
discussion’s sake also specifically focuses on homebuyers. Thus, the prosperity of the 
commercial banks has a much more direct impact on the “real economy” than does that 
of investment banks, which underwrite bond and stock offering for large corporations. 
The severe contraction of lending is how the mortgage crisis turning into the financial 
crisis.69  
The Basel Accords, Capital Requirements, and Liabilities 
The reason why commercial banks bought so many MBS is due to provisions laid 
out in the Basel Accords. The first Basel Accord, reached in 1988, was adopted by over 
100 countries including the United States in 1991. According to the Basel I Accords, a 
commercial bank is considered adequately capitalized if it can fund at least eight percent 
of its assets with “capital.” Capital acts as a buffer or margin of error against potential 
losses and is money that the bank does not owe to anyone else; essentially, all money that 
is not debt. The point of contention here, is that most of a bank’s money is debt, money 
that it owes creditors as well as depositors, business, and other banks it may have 
borrowed from. Capital is the money a bank would have left over if the bank were to 
repay all of its collective debts.70  
One of the most important sources of capital for a bank is equity, the earnings and 
funds a bank receives from selling shares of itself to the public. Any money gained from 
selling stock is the bank’s money, and it is free to do with it what is pleases, as long as it 
remains solvent. Banks, being in the business of making profits, usually employ their 
capital along with money it borrows from depositors and bond holders, to make loans, of 
which the most salient to this discussion are mortgages, and investments such as MBS. 
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The loans and investments are considered “assets” due to the fact that they own them and 
are expected to pay the bank back some sort of return, for instance, interest and principle 
payments on a MBS.71 
Any liabilities that are owed by the bank to its creditors are fixed and must be 
paid back in full. The assets the bank holds, however, usually fluctuate. Some mortgages 
may default or some investments may not pay out as much as was anticipated, this is why 
a bank keeps capital on hand, in order to pay back its debts if called upon to do so, even if 
it has not made enough through its assets, it has reserves. If a bank’s assets directly match 
the amount of liabilities it holds, any slight decline in the bank’s assets will lead it to 
insolvency. A bank’s capital is thusly an imperative margin of error in shielding a bank 
against that risk.72 
Another way in which a bank can come up with capital is reserving some of its 
earnings as “loan-loss reserve” funds. Under the Basel Accords I, loan-loss reserves are 
capped at 1.25 percent of a bank’s assets.73 The result, in brief, is that the bank is thereby 
protected against expected losses. What happened during the Crisis was a series of large-
scale unpredicted losses. Thus, the limitations set forth in the Basel Accords meant that 
banks were not fully prepared for any unexpected losses.74  
In 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission penalized Sun Trust for 
holding on to too much capital. Since then, banks have been trepid of retaining too much 
capital for the fear of fines and penalties and of course, not earning profits. According to 
the Basel Accords, individual or “whole” mortgages were given a risk assessment of 50% 
and thus, banks were mandated to allocate $4 of capital for every $100 in mortgages it 
originated. The Basel Accords also assigned a risk weight of 20% to securities issued by 
“public sector” entities, which in the case of the United States meant GSEs. If a bank 
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were to buy $100 of those securities, then they would only have to allot $1.60 for capital. 
What ended up happening was that banks would originate mortgages, sell them to GSEs 
for securitization, and then buy it back as part of an agency MBS which came with the 
lower capital requirement. This exercise of regulatory arbitrage reduced any bank’s need 
for scarce capital by 60 percent which meant that for whatever reason, if enough 
depositors demanded their savings from an institution, the bank would reach insolvency 
due to the fact that it did not have enough cash on hand to pay back its debts.75  
As noted previously, GSE’s were not allowed to securitize subprime whole 
mortgages. Investment banks, however, could buy subprime mortgages from commercial 
banks and mortgage specialists, securitize them, and then sell the shares in the resulting 
PLMBS to the GSEs for their own investments. These investments helped the GSEs 
fulfill their mandates from HUD, and by April 2008, the GSEs held $308 billion worth of 
PLMBS, making them the second largest holder of such assets, the first being 
commercial banks, who collectively held $473 billion. The availability of this transfer of 
risk as well as the securitization and insurance that the GSEs provided created further 
incentive for banks to purchase mortgages as well as originate them. What this meant was 
that banks would then start to offer mortgages to more people, however, once “prime” 
borrowers had been saturated, it was then time to reduce standards and offer mortgages to 
“subprime” borrowers.76 
Where we are now 
 It is imperative to remember that the encouragements of subprime loans and 
increased lending were born out of public policy goals and an initiative to create 
widespread homeownership. The fact that homeownership is closely tied with the 
American identity meant that the government did whatever it could to promote any type 
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of economic program in order to reach its ideological goals. While that seems fairly 
obvious, what was not obvious was the fact that the transition from ideology to economic 
implementation is not seamless, and has been to a very large degree, problematic.  
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Chapter 3: Property Rights at the Founding 
 When examining property ownership in the United States and its historical 
significance throughout American history, it is imperative to examine the rights to 
property and ownership at the Founding. The American Revolution came about largely 
due to various violations of property rights and ownership and the ways in which the 
Framers constructed Founding documents, namely the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution, reflected the importance that private property played in preserving 
liberty and freedom.77 
 Starting in 1765, Colonists began resisting British Governance due to the Crown’s 
new taxation policies. As the taxes continued and increased, political disobedience grew 
more outright and the demand for change became more pronounced. The tensions 
escalated, and larger protests occurred such as the Boston Tea Party in 1773. With the 
Coercive Acts that followed as retribution, mounting pressure eventually led to the 
drafting of the Declaration of Independence where leading Patriots gathered to officially 
affirm their status as an autonomous nation. With that proclamation, the thirteen colonies 
became the thirteen states of the United States of America, allied under the Articles of 
Confederation.78  
 With the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the American Revolutionary War 
ended, however, the injustices that the Patriots had fought against still remained.79 Debtor 
relief laws as well as other property rights violations were commonplace, this time at the 
behest of the state legislatures. In Vices of the Political System of the United States, 
James Madison wrote that all civilizations are divided into factions, two being debtors 
and creditors.80 Throughout the new states, debtor relief laws were rampant. These were 
egregious violations of property rights in that debts that were owed were forgiven; private 
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property that was owed was allowed to remain unreturned. Loans that were issued were 
left unpaid, and in the case of Rhode Island, the state itself printed money in order to pay 
off debts.81 All of this was allowed under the individual states’ laws, and often 
contradicted the laws of the other states in the Confederation.  By the year 1787, it was 
evident that there was a growing need for a stronger, more cohesive governance code and 
the Second Constitutional Congress was assembled.82 
 Great debates between those who wanted a stronger, centralized government 
(Federalists), and those who wanted stronger state governments and a weaker centralized 
government (Anti-Federalists) took place. The Federalist view-point prevailed, but not 
without the admission of the Bill of Rights, an Anti-Federalist addition.83  
  When trying to discern the reasons why property continues to play such an 
integral role in the American identity, it is necessary to examine the ways in which 
property was defined as well as the importance it played in the foundations of the nation. 
The Revolution, and thus, the United States, came about only through the political unrest 
that resulted in systemic violations of property rights, thus, the protection of those rights 
ended up becoming the basis for American society.  
 The American cultural fixation on property and ownership hold its establishment 
at the Founding, and looking at the philosophies of the writers of the Founding 
documents is imperative in tracing back the origins of American property ownership and 
its pursuit in American political thought and culture.  
Thomas Jefferson 
 “If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of 
his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will 
he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the 
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dominion and control of any other power?…and it is not without reason, that he seeks 
out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind 
to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by 
the general name, property.”  –John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government84 
  
 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” –The Declaration of Independence85 
 Thomas Jefferson was a man of property as well as an avid espouser of 
Enlightenment ideology. Owning a considerable amount of property himself in the form 
of Virginia farm land as well as slaves, he remains one the greatest theorists on the 
subject of human liberty. The primary offense that the American revolutionaries had 
regarding the power of the King was an overt violation of their natural rights. The Rights 
of Englishmen or what many called natural rights, were violated in a variety of ways 
including the seizure of private property without proper representation. The primary goal, 
then, of the Revolution was a preservation and restoration of these so-called natural 
rights.86  
 It should be noted that this preservation of longstanding rights as well as the 
restoration of certain privileges did, in no way, entail, at least in theory, a complete 
overhaul of property rights or the construction of systemic redistribution of property. The 
leaders of the Revolution, property owners and intellectuals in their own right, sought to 
maintain their status and protect the means by which men could obtain property, but did 
not ascribe to the reallocation of property. Due to the violations of private property that 
occurred during the Revolution, particularly in the form of the Intolerable Acts, the 
Quartering Acts, and taxation acts which solicited new and ever-increasing duties on the 
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Colonies, the protection of property became one of, if not the primary, goal of the 
Revolution.87  
 The Enlightenment philosopher, John Locke, too, wrote his First and Second 
Treatise to express his grievances against the English Crown, and its appropriation of 
property in the form of taxes. He discussed the natural rights of men, and insisted that 
men have a natural right to the land, a right which does not require the explicit consent of 
others and is granted by the laws of reason. Locke viewed the ownership of private 
property as antecedent to government, and indeed, the only purpose of government was 
to protect the rights that men hold over their property. Society then, did not need 
government except for the protection of rights, however, men would continue to possess 
their property even without the existence of government.88 
  This division between government and society made possible limited revolutions, 
revolutions that would affect only the status and structure of government, not society. 
The dissolution of government would not mean the dissolution of society. Thus, 
Jefferson, and many of his compatriots, believed that they could overhaul the Colonies’ 
governance system and put in place a new one, without a complete restructure of society 
as a whole.  
 Property did not just refer to the possession over one’s body and labor but referred 
additionally to the rights, both personal and political, of individuals. Physical property 
was meant to affirm the natural liberties of men by providing autonomy and tools for 
independent economic development. Given this definition of property, when Locke 
philosophized that property was the end goal of government, he was stating that the end 
goal of government should be the protection of rights and liberties, not just property in 
the physical sense. The protection of property is pre-political, a natural institution given 
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to man from God and that ownership gives the owner absolute control over something 
which no one, even, and especially the state, can violate. 
  Jefferson’s ideology can be most obviously seen in the crafting of the 
Declaration of Independence where he rewrote Locke’s premise and created a phrase that 
is possibly one of the most famous in the American mythology, that is, “…life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness.”89 The origins of this quote would not be lost on the fellow 
signatories of the Declaration, nor its intended audience. The rhetorical symmetries 
between Locke’s verse and Jefferson’s phrase would resonate with the document’s 
intended audience and indeed, the clarity of the purpose of the statement would transcend 
the adaptation. While Jefferson wrote “happiness,” which some scholars argue was 
Jefferson’s ultimate meaning, that fulfillment could only be attained through the pursuit 
of property due to the economic and political liberties associate with it. While a state of 
happiness might be a psychological one, in Jefferson’s view, whatever happiness might 
mean could not be achieved without the attainment of property, thus, the need to 
explicitly state property as a goal of government and society would be unnecessary since 
it was understood that if happiness was a goal, so then would property be.90 Thus, 
although Jefferson did not use Locke’s statement verbatim, there was a clear rhetorical 
linkage that indicated that the protection of property was to be enforced. The statement 
stands in perpetuity as a promise to protect property, in its many forms, and as a goal for 
the newly founded American Republic.  
 Jefferson, like most of his other colleagues, did not value property for property’s 
own sake. He valued it for its political meaning, to serve as a barrier between a 
democratic government and its people. To that effect, he made clear, in his work and 
writings concerning Virginian law before the Revolution, that society would be better off 
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with a wider distribution of property and worked to make legal the allowances that every 
male of appropriate age be entitled to 50 acres of land to be in his in “full and absolute 
dominion, and no other person shall be capable of taking an appropriation.”91 To add to 
the broader distribution of wealth, he included that the tradition of primogeniture, where 
the rights of inheritance are given to the first born male, be abolished and that females be 
entitled to the same inheritance rights as their male counterparts.  Additionally, he 
believed that the abolition of engrossment and entails should occur. Such aggregation of 
large parcels of land was unsuitable for Virginia since it tended to create a privileged 
class that by the perpetuation of its own wealth, created an aristocracy which is 
dangerous to society.92  
 Instead, in Jefferson’s view, there should be an aristocracy of virtue and talent, 
“which nature has wisely proved for the direction of the interests of society, & scattered 
with equal hand through all its conditions, was deemed essential to a well ordered 
republic.” The allowance for broader property ownership was an imperative, then, for a 
well-structured society. Jefferson sought to create, “a system by which every fibre would 
be eradicated of ancient of culture aristocracy and a foundation laid for a government 
truly republican.”93  
 Additionally, Jefferson believed that immigrants to the State of Virginia should 
have rights to land that they themselves could cultivate and that the lands west of the 
Virginia Mountains be sold in small parcels and governance be organized on a republican 
basis. Locke’s only limit to private property was that there must be enough and as good 
left for others and that no one can take more than he can use.94 Jefferson never believed 
this to be a realistic problem for the State, and later for the nation, due to the Continent’s 
vastly unpopulated (save for the Native Americans) lands and virgin territories. The idea 
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of allocating 50-acre parcels to all men of legal age as well as all immigrants was realistic 
due to the sheer amount of territory left to be aggregated. These beliefs lay behind the 
Northwest Ordinance, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Homesteading initiatives of the 
1860s.95 In a letter from France in 1785, Jefferson attributed vast European poverty to the 
fact that the nobility had enclosed large tracts of land and withdrawn them from 
production. Jefferson believed that the best way to avoid such an occurrence in the 
Colonies was to create a wider distribution of property ownership.96 
 It should be noted that there is a difference between Jefferson’s goals of wider 
property ownership and his distaste for systemic redistribution of land. He, along with 
Federalist’s and Anti-Federalists alike believed in the protection of the rights to pursue 
property and its ownership, and worked extensively to create boundaries for government 
intervention. Redistribution entails taking from those who have private property and 
giving it to those who do not. Jefferson was wholly against this type of scheme, and 
should be distinguished from his actual ideology.97  
 The view that Jefferson held about property ownership was also specific about the 
types of land owners that should be prevalent in the American schematic. Like Adam 
Smith, Jefferson placed importance in the types of owners that would use land in what he 
believed was the best way. As Adam Smith believed that the best owners were those who 
create land usages with optimal utility, Jefferson believed that the best land owners were 
those who productively used the land, and at the time, that was generally those of 
agriculture. He said of farmers that, “those who labour the earth are the chosen people of 
God, if ever had had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for 
substantial and genuine virtue.”98 
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 To John Jay he wrote that, “cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. 
They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to 
their country and wedded to its liberty and interest by the most lasting bonds. As long 
therefore as they can find employment in this line, I would not convert them to mariners, 
artisans, or anything else.”99 Where Smith valued utility, Jefferson saw the importance of 
virtuous citizenry. In Jefferson’s view, only by independent labor could a man divorce 
himself of his subordination to others.100  
 When putting forth ideas for a Legislative branch, Jefferson believed that there 
should be two qualifications for service in the upper house: to be wise and to be 
“perfectly independent” however, he did not believe it necessary to require that Senators 
own property.101 In general, he believed that the decisions of the people, in a body, would 
be more honest and disinterested than those of wealthy men. Whoever lives in a country 
must wish that country well and has a natural right of assisting in the preservation of it. 
Jefferson believed that one could not reasonably distinguish between such a person who 
lived in the country, having no fixed property, and one living in a township who does.102  
 Government, according to Jefferson should only have limited powers. Ideally 
those only to protect the divinely given rights of men, namely the protection of private 
property and the pursuit of it. Jefferson believed that the state should exercise no more 
power than the minimum authority needed to maintain social order.103  
James Madison 
 “The first object of government was the protection of different and unequal 
faculties of acquiring property”—James Madison, The Federalist No. 10104 
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 In the late 1780s, there was a growing sentiment amongst the leaders of the 
Revolution, those who had led and fought in the war as well as drafted the Declaration 
that there was an increasing need to create another binding document to replace the 
Articles of Confederation. In the debates that took place during the Second Continental 
Congress, the ideology of Federalism clearly won, however, not without variation 
amongst its advocates.105  
 The primary goals that bound all of the revolutionaries together during the war 
had been that men had the right to be bound by laws only to which they had consented. 
The idea of “No taxation without representation” became a popular vocalization of that 
sentiment.  
 The idea of consent extended to property as well, with the notion that man was a 
slave if his property could be taken away without his consent. Due to the grievances of 
the British Crown during the Revolution, and then state legislature and governments 
during the period of the Articles of Confederation, there was a realization that property 
could also be threatened by a democratically elected government as well.  
 Madison believed that good government must be able to protect the rights of 
people as well as the rights of property, and clearly distinguished the two. Madison held 
the view that if political rights were granted to all people equally, then, the rights of 
people and the rights of property would not be equally protected. Thus, one set of rights 
had to take primacy in the framing of the Constitution. For Madison, the choice was 
clear: the rights of property were the most important rights because once the preservation 
of property was ensured, then only would all other rights be able to follow. Property was 
also imperative to the fledgling republic in that it preserved not just political but 
economic stability as well.106  
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 Madison believed that the reason why one set of rights had to take precedent 
ahead of the other set was not over theoretical nor moral grounds. He believed that 
ensuring both sets of rights would be practically difficult. He foresaw that the United 
States would eventually be divided between the rich and the poor, and that the poor 
would be a majority that was without property. Since the poor would be both the majority 
as well as without property, they would be disinterested in protecting the rights to 
property, and in fact, would be interested in violating those rights. Due to the political 
power as well as economic advantages that property brings, it is, per human nature, 
natural for those without to covet that which they do not possess. Thus, the majority 
would have a vested interest in violating the rights of the minority. Since those particular 
rights are the natural rights of men, then it is the government’s objective to protect those 
rights. Due to the fact that the protection of property was to be the end goal of 
government, it followed then that any governmental system would need to protect against 
a tyranny of a propertyless majority. In Madison’s view, people then posed a threat to the 
rights of property which by extension threatened political and economic stability.107  
 This also brings to the front the discussion of suffrage. Per Madison, “men cannot 
be justly bound by laws in making of which they have no part.”108 Thus, men have a 
fundamental right to suffrage. If the rights to suffrage, however, were extended to all, 
then, the controlling power in government would belong to the propertyless majority, 
which, as discussed, would have no interest in the preservation of property rights. 
Madison believed that the rights to property superseded the individual rights of people, 
and thus the preservation of property would have to exist at the cost of universal suffrage. 
Thus, suffrage could only be granted to those who would be interested in preserving the 
rights to property, namely the propertied, otherwise called, Freeholders.109  
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 In principle, there is not a conflict between the rights of people and the rights of 
property and suffrage was a right to be universally granted. In practice, however, if 
political rights were given equally to all, then the rights of people and the rights of 
property would be unequally protected, with property rights being violated most 
egregiously.  
 In terms of representation, Madison believed that the lower house, the House of 
Representatives, should be duly elected by the people and represent the rights of the 
people, while the upper house, the Senate, would be represented by the propertied, thus 
protecting the rights of property. The election of the President would be open to a 
“qualified part” of the populace, namely, Freeholders.110 Madison said, “In general view, 
I see no reason why the rights of property which chiefly bears the burden of government 
and is so much an object of legislation should not be represented as well as personal 
rights in the choice of rulers”.111 Essentially, the propertied have the most at stake in the 
well-being of the government and nation, thus, should be given the most opportunity and 
advocacy in government.  
 Unlike Jefferson, who believed that those who were to govern merely needed to 
be wise and perfectly independent but did not deem property ownership as a prerequisite, 
Madison saw a clear tie between property ownership and the qualifications for 
membership in government. Creating laws required the acumen of a “few select and 
skillful individuals” and that there were advantages of “learned institutions” in that they, 
“multiply the educated individuals from among whom the people may elect a due portion 
of their public Agents of every description; more especially of those who are to frame the 
laws.”112 Looking at the rhetoric employed, from Madison’s perspective, the individuals 
	  42 
	  
that were best suited to govern were those who were associated with property ownership, 
namely, those who had the means to attend such “learned institutions.”113  
 The wealth that came from property gave advantages to those who owned, namely 
the means to educate oneself on the virtues of good government. Additionally, given the 
suffrage rights, property owners would duly select other property owners to represent 
them, due to the alignment of their interests. Madison stated that the best representatives 
would be, “Men of intelligence, patriotism, property and independent circumstances.”114 
Clearly then it would not just be men of property, but an elite class that would be charged 
with governance. Due to this unofficial prerequisite, it would remain immensely difficult 
for the propertyless to be elected, even if they met the constitutional requirements to hold 
public office.  
 The importance of property lay in its historical meaning as well as its theoretical. 
The British Crown as well as state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation had 
violated the rights of property through unjust taxation, the depreciation of paper money, 
and debtor relief laws. Unlike Locke, Madison did not use the term property to stand for 
all individual rights.115 Property for Madison did not incorporate or symbolize all 
individual rights, but the protection of property rights in a republic was a part of the 
general challenge of private rights. Property, however, did not have as narrow a definition 
to limit it to tangible, physical property. In the Madisonian concept, the term “property” 
included the free exercise of faculties for acquisition.116  
 The protection then of property meant the protection of its acquisition as well, 
however, this did not mean that the government was responsible for equitable acquisition. 
In a 1792 article, Madison wrote that it was the government’s view to protect the 
“different and unequal faculties of acquiring property” meaning that the goal of 
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government was not to ensure an equitable distribution of private property but to 
guarantee the equitable protection of acquisition and possession of property.  Thus, the 
protection of liberty was the protection of possession, even if it was unequal.117  
 If a government could not protect property, people would turn to forms of other 
government, namely, non-republican forms of government, that would. Thus, republican 
government was tied to the protection of property. Property, therefore, became the 
paradigmatic issue of republican success. A failure of republicanism in the United States 
would mean the defeat of republicanism everywhere.118  
 Jefferson’s and Madison’s ideologies differ primarily on the subject of the spread 
of property ownership. As noted earlier, Jefferson wholly believed in the wider spread of 
property ownership and went to great pains to alter Virginian law to reflect those ideals. 
Madison, however, did not seem to view the spread of property as imperative to the 
moral integrity of government. In a letter, Jefferson wrote,  
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable. But the 
consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk 
of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many devices for subdividing property, 
only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural 
affections of the human mind. The descent of property of every kind therefore to 
all the children, or to all the brothers and sisters, or other relations in equal degree 
is a politic measure, and a practicable one…Whenever there is in any country, 
uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have 
been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common 
stock for man to labour and live on. If, for the encouragement of industry we 
allow it to be appropriated, we must take care that other employment be furnished 
to those excluded from the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to 
labour the earth returns to the unemployed.119  
 
Jefferson believed that the use of land carried with it a responsibility to cultivate it and 
use it meaningfully. The rights of property were contingent upon the fulfillment of that 
obligation. Madison was not fearful of concentrated ownership of land, and viewed such 
unequal ownership as a part of the protection of the equal exercise of the faculties of 
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men. The “rules of justice” demanded the protection of equal exercise, which if freely 
entertained, meant that due to the inequality in the faculties of men, the unequal 
acquisition of property would occur. The suffering of the poor, or the propertyless, was 
not evidence that property should be redistributed nor warranted a governmental 
intervention to change property allocation. Madison believed that since there was an 
inevitable propertyless majority, its need not be taken into account. Madison also 
believed that a robust economy would minimize poverty so the very poor of which 
Jefferson spoke would be minimal. The only object that the government should guarantee 
for the propertyless is a thriving economy. 
 Gouvenor Morris  
 One of Madison’s allies at the Constitutional Convention, and a student of 
political economy, Morris advocated for the constitutional protection of property rights as 
a means for preserving the nation as a market economy. In Morris’ view, life and liberty 
were not the reason why men came together to form society. It was for the mutual 
protection of property that men gave up greater freedom allowed in the State of Nature 
and acquiesced themselves to the confines of government and society. Property was then 
the only reason for men to submit themselves to the will of others. It also served as the 
source for all benefits of society, namely wealth and economic independence.120  
 In the name of furthering economic development, the rights to property should be 
duly protected for if there are not protections against the unjust obtainment of another’s 
labor or the product of one’s labor, then there will be no incentive to labor. To that effect, 
Morris stated,  
Unless the rewards of industry are secure, no one will be industrious; for the 
motive which prompts the toils of a laborious man, is the hope of enjoying what 
those toils produce. This produce is wealth, and whether it be in one shape or 
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another, so long as it is employed for the purpose of increasing the commodities 
in a country is it beneficial and no longer.121 
 
Thus, Morris’ primacy of property rights lay completely within the realms of economics 
and in the interest of protecting market economy practices.  
 Like Jefferson, Morris believed in the productive use of property and warned 
against the concentration of property ownership. He, like Jefferson, believed that there 
was a limit to the amount of land owners could obtain and use with utility: “A monopoly 
of the soil is pernicious or even destructive to society, let taxes, therefore, compel the 
owner, either to cultivate it himself or sell it to those who will cultivate it.”122 Here 
Morris believed in using taxes, an economic vehicle, to indicate the optimal amount of 
land to be held by each owner, and due to unequal faculties, the optimal amount of land 
to be used with the most utility varied among owners.  
 In terms of representation, Morris agreed with Madison’s view that the House of 
Representative was to be for the people and the Senate was to be held by the aristocracy 
to protect the rights to property. His reasoning for having the propertied wealthy in an 
isolated chamber, however, differed from Madison’s. Instead, Morris argued that the 
people should put the “tyrannical rich” in public view in the Senate.123 Only then would 
the populace be able to see that their own interests were not aligned with those of the 
rich, and then they will be duly isolated.  
 Morris also believed that the optimal voters were Freeholders. He argued that if 
the right to vote were granted to the economically dependent they would then sell their 
votes or would be easily swayed by the more educated. Additionally, property not only 
allowed for economic independence, but forced one to have a stake in the community 
around oneself. This, in Morris’ view, would create a more engaged republic and thus the 
protection of property was imperative for an engaged citizenry. Property ownership 
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would allow people to meaningfully and responsibly participate in politics.  Therefore, 
the only way to ensure the sanctity of suffrage was to grant it to those who were 
economically independent, that is, the class of the propertied.124 
Economic Framing and Political Biases  
 In An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution Charles Beard, writing in 1913, 
discussed the fact that the attendees of the Second Constitutional Congress were all of a 
particular elite class. In another work, Framing the Constitution, Beard points out that all 
of the men in attendance had some sort of formal political training and were highly 
educated and thus, all came from aristocratic backgrounds.125  
 In An Economic Interpretation¸ Beard postulates that the Framers’ Constitution is 
so conservative in its construct that it is actually anti-democratic, due to its exclusion of 
suffrage for all and serves to protect the rights of the aristocratic few. Beard further 
argues that the Constitution was created to solely protect one class—the wealthy—
seemingly self-serving given the economic backgrounds of the participants of the 
Convention. Indeed, as noted earlier, the Constitution was created to protect from the 
tyranny of the majority, the majority being the inevitable propertyless.126  
 While the House of Representatives was to be the “guardians of the poor,” the 
checks and balances in the system of government were in place to disallow the poor from 
ever aggregating enough political leverage to damage the property interests of the 
wealthy.127  
 Beard noted that a factious nation was encouraged by Madison to prevent the 
occurrence of an aggregated propertyless group from amassing enough political power to 
incite change, or indeed, a revolution. The fears of a volatile democracy were focused on 
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what constant fluctuations in sentiment would mean for the economic prospects of the 
nation.128  
 In the North, merchants and businessmen joined with the landowners of the South 
in their anxieties of revolution that would result in systemic redistribution of wealth, and 
thus, the risk of the poor from accumulating enough consensus and political power was 
one to be mitigated. What resulted was a systematic repression of the consideration of the 
well-being of the poor, and the most noted response was one given by Gouvenor Morris, 
and echoed by Madison, that the wellbeing of the poor would be duly addressed with the 
promotion of a robust economy, which could only be achieved through the protection of 
private property. Thus, the Framers, although diverse in their opinions on a variety of 
topics, were almost unanimous in their campaign to protect private property. Indeed, the 
conservatism of government in the pursuit of the protection of property rights is clear in 
the Constitution and governmental restraint prevailed for much of the next century and a 
half. 
Conclusion 
 Jefferson, Madison, and Morris held different views on property ownership but 
none could deny its significance in preserving liberty and republican ideals. Jefferson 
believed that there should be widespread ownership to deter from a highly concentrated 
aristocracy, while Madison believed that property rights should take precedence over all 
other rights and that in turn ensured the preservation of property, and the preservation of 
republicanism would duly follow. Gouvenor Morris, with his interests vested deeply in 
the conservation of a market-economy, believed that property rights should be ensured to 
perpetuate a robust economy.  
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 From these three leaders, it is apparent that the preservation of private property is 
absolute. None of the mentioned thinkers, nor indeed their most noted colleagues, 
believed that property should not be protected.129 In the years that followed, judicial 
review solidified the barrier between the state’s encroachment upon private property 
rights. The Civil War, which largely has its origins in the preservation of the institution of 
slavery, was fought due to the preservation of another type of property right. The period 
of homesteading in the American West was largely a tangible realization of Jeffersonian 
ideals as well as a means to distinguish independent, individual farming practices from 
those utilized in the South.  
 The shift in property rights came largely after the installment of President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal plan, an economic plan to rebuff the commercial collapse brought 
on by the Great Depression. At that juncture, the Supreme Court began to utilize different 
viewpoints on property rights and the era of increased government intervention began. 
Most notable of these mediations was the reformation and regulation of the banking 
sector as well as the increased housing initiatives in the inter- and post-War eras. The 
conception of property morphed, but the Revolution era ideologies of equality and liberty 
endured and their intersection in the 1930s and onwards created a new idea of equitable 
property ownership, namely, homeownership.   
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Chapter 4: From Framers to Judges: A History of Government Intervention 
Although the Framers seemed to have created an absolutist ideology concerning 
the preservation of property rights and the limitation of government that accompanied 
those protections, in the decades that followed, the practicality of government 
intervention and property right preservation was defined in real world experiences. 
 In any given society, it is the people and government of that culture that make and 
define property and similarly choose which types of property to protect.130 Economic 
systems are often determined by what society deems as property and what is allowed to 
be traded, bought, and sold. Philosophers and theorists establish rules to govern society 
and boundaries to limit government’s power; however, the enforcement of those rules 
and boundaries is left to posterity, and therein lies the complexity of preserving ideology. 
The needs of society change, and what follows is a change in the adaptations of the very 
rules and boundaries that govern society. This phenomenon has occurred time and time 
again in American history, and it is this history that explains how political thought at the 
nation’s Founding caused the Financial Crisis.  
 In the previous chapter, the Founding ideologies of property protection were 
discussed at length and it is clear that the majority of the intellectuals who crafted 
Founding documents found it imperative to protect property rights, even at the expense of 
personal rights, which were often deemed as secondary. The reasons for why the 
Founders placed so much importance on property rights differ, however, the resulting 
framework of the Constitution is a direct result of these efforts, and the preservation of 
private property was given undoubtable primacy in the ensuing American tradition.  
 While the ideologies regarding property rights seem absolute and the framework 
for the government readily laid out with limitations on power, there still remained 
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determinations of how, in literal implementation, the government would interact with the 
populace and where the lines would be logistically drawn regarding the protection of 
private property.  
 In this regard, there were a myriad of political decisions made by institutions such 
as the Judiciary, Congress, and military elites, in the decades following the Founding that 
solidified exactly how government would interact with property.131 From the 1780s until 
the late 1920s, when the Great Depression forced the government and theorists alike to 
reconsider new economic paradigms, property was generally kept out of the 
government’s reach, albeit with some remarkable exceptions. The turning point of 
government interaction, that is, the increase of government intervention in the realms of 
private property is where the foundations for the Housing Crisis and subsequent financial 
crisis lay, thus, it is imperative to understand not only property rights at the founding but 
their transcendence  through time as well.  
 Property, conceptually, is innately complex because it derives its worth and 
existence largely through reciprocal relationships among people.132 Property serves as a 
physical denotation of an owner’s individuality, a theme often professed by Thomas 
Jefferson, who viewed propertied persons as the most independent, and thus, the most 
ideal citizens. There are caveats to protecting private property, however, and this is the 
point of contention that plagued even the Founders, but that the government has since 
still tried to reconcile. This conflict results from the right of the majority to regulate 
economic activity in order to advance communal goals of the public while also protecting 
private property owners from others’ intrusion. 
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The Louisiana Purchase  
 Scholars often refer to the two Jeffersons: one that wanted a society of small, 
independent farmers; and the other that believed in strict protection of property from 
government. These two sides of Jefferson’s ideology come into conflict with the 
Louisiana Purchase. Due to their wartime spending, the French sold the Louisiana 
Territory to the United States at the onset of the 19th century.  Consisting of land that now 
forms 15 states, the expansion of the United States under the presidency of Thomas 
Jefferson was a clear demonstration of the former of his two beliefs.133 During his time in 
the Virginia State Legislature, Jefferson advocated for the rights of any male of legal age 
to acquire land and utilize it productively, and that it should be the State’s (i.e. the 
government) job to ensure that right. Jefferson never reasoned that the nation would run 
out of land to allot, due to the vast size of the continent. From that, the Louisiana 
Purchase is a direct manifestation of his idea of widespread ownership. With this 
transaction, the government claimed nearly twice the amount of land it previously 
controlled, further creating the prospect of an agrarian society.  
 Under the Constitution as it was written, there was no provision given to the 
Executive that he may acquire landed property. Thus, at the time of the acquisition many 
accused the President of acting unconstitutionally. The Executive is, however, granted the 
right to negotiate treaties, and Jefferson forged ahead.134  
The issue of property rights concerning slavery arose in the territory through the 
presidency of James Monroe, who signed the Missouri Compromise in 1820 as a final 
solution to the slavery issue. The Southern representatives in Congress argued that the 
disallowance of slavery would prohibit the agrarian spread due to the fact that farming 
was largely supported by slave labor. Thus, the prohibition of slavery in those states 
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would have duly hindered the spread of agrarian practices, one of Jefferson’s primary 
goals of the purchase. Northerners were wholly against the allowance, but Members of 
Congress needed an agreement. Thus, below the 36°30′ latitude line, slavery was allowed 
to exist, and above it, it was outlawed. Later, due to the thousands of acres of farmable 
land available in the territories, it was determined that infrastructure was needed. Stephen 
Douglass, the Democratic Leader of the Senate, constructed a bill that allowed popular 
sovereignty, the right of the local citizenry to determine if slavery would be allowed in 
the region, to be the determinant of slave holding in those areas. What resulted was the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act which then caused the flooding of both abolitionist and pro-slavery 
campaigns into the area, particularly Kansas, exacerbating the tensions between the North 
and South and contributing significantly to the instigation of the Civil War.135  
This type of government intervention regarding property rights is a direct 
violation of the type of limited government that Jefferson and the Framers advocated so 
rigorously for. It was done, however, in the pursuit of propagating another Founding 
ideal: the creation of independent property owners. In Jefferson’s view, while society is 
better off with protection of private property, the government has to step in to ensure 
widespread property rights as well, thus, the completion of the Louisiana Purchase. With 
Douglass, the protection of property manifested itself in the allowance of self-governance 
in the territories, but then allowed in many instances, for the perpetuation of slavery, an 
institution that largely goes against the Lockean ideals of labor and property. What these 
instances show is the constant contention between the protection of property, the pursuit 
of wider spread property ownership, and the reconciliation of Founding ideals with 
practicality. They also demonstrate that from the onset of the Republic, government 
intervention has been rationalized for the achievement of the previously mentioned goals. 
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The continuation of government intervention for the fulfillment of these ideals is a 
common trend that helps explain the modern government intervention that affect many 
economic practices, most notably the more recent economic crisis.  
Homesteading  
 In the Homestead Act of 1862, President Lincoln stated that, “I am in favor of 
settling the wild lands into small parcels so that every poor man may have a home.”136 
The Act offered 160 acres of land, practically for free, if the tenants promised to settle 
and work it for five years. Lincoln’s pledge was a further vocalization and demonstration 
of Jefferson’s ideal agrarian society, and further evidence that the Founders’ ideals 
perpetuated through time. Lincoln promised land to anyone who was willing to 
productively cultivate it, thus producing the independent landowner that Jefferson 
idealized.137  
 A few years following the Civil War, John Wesley Powell, the noted geologist 
and explorer conducted expeditions to the West and concluded in many of them that the 
Western territories were far too arid for agricultural development due to the amount of 
irrigation needed for farming.  Powell served as director of the United States Geological 
Survey and even though his works were highly publicized and well-known for their 
accuracy, the West was still settled as a part of various homesteading initiatives that were 
created largely as a part of the ideology of the pursuit of wider property ownership and an 
agrarian society.138 The United States government, regardless of scientific fact, pushed 
forward property initiatives that were contrary to perceived efficacy simply to fulfill 
goals that were established at the Founding of the nation. The phenomenon of ignoring 
risk and efficiency by the government for the sake of fulfillment of ideologically driven 
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goals is a trend that is also seen in the legislation and initiatives that caused the housing 
bubble and ensuing crisis.   
 The “Colonization of the West” has been largely seen as the conduit for the 
creation of true American democracy as well as the cultivation of true American identity. 
Frederick Jackson Turner argued that the allowance of land granted to American citizens 
was imperative in the creation of the modern American identity that is distinct from its 
European heritage. The American Frontier allowed people to separate themselves from 
the Eastern standards of American culture that held roots in European traditions and 
create a more distinctive American values in the West. This culture was one that was 
characterized by independent private property ownership.  Perhaps the most profound 
take away from Turner’s thesis is that the land ownership opportunities were crucial to 
the American experience, so critical, in fact, that despite outright warnings of risk, 
property ownership initiatives were allowed to progress.139  
The Civil War, Slavery, and Reconstruction 
The Founders had exhaustedly declared that the right to acquire and maintain 
one’s own property was, undeniably, to be the prime protectorate of the government. 
Paradoxically, however, government, throughout American history, engaged in various 
policy plans to redistribute property for the sake of wider property ownership. In most 
cases, property reallocation was often times done in the name of the public good, for 
politically moral and ethical reasons such as equality and freedom, and also most 
importantly to protect the so called “Founding Ideology” of widespread property 
ownership. The contention between Jefferson’s desires for a society of property owners 
as well as limited government played out through the ensuring century and a half after the 
era of Jeffersonian Republican rule.  
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Some of the most egregious examples of this property reallocation occurred in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. The Sherman Papers, often referred to as Special Field 
Orders, No. 15, were issued by General William Tecumseh Sherman who was a 
commander of the Union Army during the Civil War. The orders declare the confiscation 
of 400,000 acres of land along the coasts of the states of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida, that were to be divided into 40-acre parcels and given to 18,000 freed slave 
families.140 This acquisition consisted of lands that had already been settled for hundreds 
of years, and were to be taken away from White owners and given to the recently freed 
persons who had worked that very land for hundreds of years. Indeed, many Freedmen 
felt a moral obligation to the land that they had worked for so long, and using language 
that parallel’s Locke’s in many ways, argued for their own opportunity to work and 
cultivate the land.  
Sherman’s issuances wholly typify property ownership’s place in the American 
tradition. They are indicative of the belief that to properly assimilate people into 
American society, there is an aspect of property ownership that is inherent. The promise 
of 40-acre parcels near the coast which would have been ideal farming land and had been 
used for that very purpose for hundreds of years, were to give new members of society 
not just land, but usable land for cultivation, echoing the Jeffersonian sentiments at the 
Founding. While Sherman had intended for his orders to be temporary, at the time of 
issuance they were not taken as such by its recipients, and “40-acres and a mule” became 
a motto for slavery reparations as well as the idea of bestowing what is owed to those 
who labored so long without the realization of the fruits of those labors.141 Regardless, 
the Orders were revoked less than a year later by President Andrew Johnson.142  
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With the passage of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the government then 
legalized what has been seen as the largest expropriation of property in American history. 
The emancipation of slaves was, in effect, the liberation of privately held property, and 
the 13th Amendment violates, in a way, the Fifth Amendment whereas the former slave 
holders were not given any compensation for their loss of property, as required.143144 That 
is not to say that the enslavement of persons is in anyway morally or ethically justified. 
Indeed, it violates many Lockean claims to private property, and the Founders were very 
much aware of the contention between the protection of the pursuit of property and the 
preservation of slavery. In his Second Treatise, Locke explicitly dictates that to take away 
the fruits of man’s labor is to subject him to slavery and that slavery is the gravest of 
violations of man’s natural rights that are granted by God, that is to say, his highest and 
more important rights.  
While Sherman’s papers were revoked by the Federal Government later on, their 
mere creation is an indication of government’s interference with private property and 
reflected a growing belief in government’s moral obligation to promote a healthy 
economy and to sustain troubled citizens. Indeed, the moral obligation to sustain a robust 
economy can again be traced back to the Founding, where Gouvenor Morris claimed that 
the end of governmental purpose should be to ensure a robust market economy, and by 
doing so, those of lower classes, i.e. the propertyless, will benefit.  
Local governments, from the Founding, used the powers of eminent domain, the 
right to take private property for public use, to advance social ends at the expense of 
private property holders.145  The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that, “Nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”146 Through 
Judicial Review, however, the United States Supreme Court expanded the Federal 
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Government’s allowances and effectively expanded the terms of “public use” to “public 
benefits” and “public purposes.” The repercussions of this is that the Judiciary, the 
guardians of the Constitution and its final interpreters, incrementally allowed the 
government to infringe upon private property and its owners’ rights for the sake of the 
“public good” however that may be defined.  
The Civil War and Reconstruction Eras ushered in a new period in American 
politics where the power of the national state was allowed to expand freedom, and in the 
process reappropriate vast amounts of private property. The Munn v. Illinois verdict made 
“property rights one among many interests, another instrument to achieve social ends 
with no more constitution protection than is accorded any other.”147 
Judicial Review 
Judicial Review has been utilized throughout history as one of the primary ways 
policies and laws are put into action. It has often been left to the courts to decide the 
limits of governmental powers in relation to laws and with the issue of property rights, 
the courts have been instrumental in the upkeep of the boundaries on government 
intervention. With those decisions, however, comes the injection of personal experience 
and judgement on the law and gives judges independent roles in American policy. That 
being said, looking at the courts’ rulings as well as judges’ reasoning, it is clear that 
property rights have fluctuated over time, often in step with changing political climates 
and thus, shifting opinions of the courts.148 
The Vermont Constitution of 1791 stated that “private property ought to be 
subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it.”149 Here, it is clear that even from 
the very establishment of the states and the time of the Founding, the government still 
took allowances for compensation of land for the public good.  Moreover, in the 1875 
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case Kohl v United States, the Supreme Court held that eminent domain is, “the offspring 
of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty.”150 Eminent domain was one 
way that government used its power to promote a “well-ordered community” and to 
advance the public good and welfare through regulations that interfered with individual 
property rights.151 In 1826 Chancellor Kent wrote that,  
every individual has as much freedom in the acquisition, use, and disposition of 
his property, as is consistent with good order and the reciprocal rights of others… 
Though property be thus protected…the lawgiver has a right to prescribe the 
mode and manner of using it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of 
the right, to the injury or annoyance of others or the public.152  
 
Kent’s remarks indicate that while individuals have the freedom to exercise their own 
rights of acquisition, the government also has the right to dictate the usage of private 
property. Justice Oliver Wendell Homes further stated that the police power of eminent 
domain created limits to property by other public interests, stating that, the government is 
within its own right to utilize property for the public good and that supersedes the private 
rights of individuals.153  
Massachusetts’ Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw professed one of the most definitive 
statements on the police power in the holding of Commonwealth v. Alger where he stated 
that,  
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil 
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be 
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, 
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right 
to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. 
All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering 
on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held 
subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and 
general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, 
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall prevent 
them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations 
established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power 
vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.154 
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Justice Shaw reasoned that all holders of property are allowed their ownership with the 
implicit understanding that its usage is under government purview. He goes on to explain 
that all land is duly consequent from the government, and echoes the longstanding 
Lockean sentiment that there are to be reasonable limitations to rights. Similar to Locke, 
Justice Shaw indicates that for the good of society, an individual’s enjoyment of his or 
her rights can be duly limited. The government, per Shaw, is then charged with creating 
“reasonable restraints and regulations” to ensure the preservation of the “common good 
and general welfare.” Looking at the rhetoric that Justice Shaw utilized, the broad 
definition allowed for police powers to encompass a variety of uses and issues. 
In an attempt to promote commerce and industry, the early 19th century state and 
federal governments campaigned for infrastructure development. Infrastructure 
development caused indirect costs and damages to the adjacent property, especially in the 
construction of roadways and railways. These developments also decreased the property 
values of the surrounding areas. The decrease in value of property rights, however, was 
held as subservient to the increase in public good these projects produced. Thus, the 
protection of private property, albeit imperative, was construed to be secondary in the 
promotion of the general welfare of the populace. In the case of Charles River Bridge v 
Warren Bridge, the Supreme Court held that protecting the company’s property rights 
was secondary to the economic and social progress that would occur if the company was 
allowed to maintain its claim on the bridge. In the decision, Chief Justice Taney stated 
that if the company’s rights were upheld, society would, “be thrown back to the 
improvements of the last century, and obliged to stand still.”155  
In the Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States¸ the Court found that hotel owners 
were obligated under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to serve African American costumers 
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and that any racial discrimination was duly illegal under Title II of the Act.156 This is an 
instance where an owner of private property was given a directive on how he or she was 
allowed to utilize private property and that, in fact, even if property is private, its usage 
could not go against public policy goals or laws set forth by the government. This 
government interference is a direct violation of the private property rights that the 
Framers instituted, however, it does align with the longstanding practice of appropriating 
property for the promulgation of the public’s good and general welfare. What these cases 
demonstrate is that the problem of race is one that cannot be solved with Laissez-Faire 
economics. Some positive intervention is required, and the government is the entity that 
is charged with that necessary interference.  
Constitutional scholars will reference a “constitutional revolution” in 1937, after 
two consecutive Justices resigned from the Court. In Homebuilding & Loan Assoc. v. 
Blaisdell, the Court held that the Minnesota law in question that extended mortgage 
contract obligations did not violate the Constitutional limitations on Congress. Chief 
Justice Hughes argued that in times of great economic emergency, there were certain 
allowances to be made, and government’s police powers were legitimate when attempting 
to, “safeguard the vital interest of its people.”157   
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., in Footnote Four, Justice Stone stated 
that the Court intended to defer to elected legislators in assessing economic regulations 
and the restrictions of property rights. Due to the fact that regulations were created for 
instrumental reasons, for instance, to aid an ailing economy or achieve social goals, the 
Court was to leave restrictions of property rights to the Legislature. In contrast, Justice 
Stone remarked that any intrusion of personal liberties, that is, those liberties that were 
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deemed secondary at the Founding to property rights, were to be examined carefully by 
the Court.158   
In the 1920s, following the stock market crash and the ensuing economic crisis, a 
“new breed of liberals” began promoting government regulation as a means to expedite 
the end of the Great Depression.159 The citizenry demanded new regulations on the banks 
and institutions that had brought down the financial system and these new liberals 
acquiesced. President Franklin Roosevelt, expanding on Herbert Hoover’s previous 
initiatives, crafted a series of social programs that permanently changed property rights in 
America. The New Deal, which encompassed a wide variety of economic and social 
plans to “kick start” the economy as well as safeguard it, was a clear infringement upon 
property rights, the most substantial being the welfare programs that reappropriated 
property, in this case money, in the form of collected taxes, which is originally an 
individual’s income, and redistributed it to others. While taxes had been collected for 
centuries prior, the New Deal initiatives were the first wholly redistributive uses of those 
taxes. The Supreme Court, which had been, until this time, the guardians of property 
rights from government intervention, succumbed to the growing need for government 
interference, and moved away from its formerly absolute defense of property rights. Its 
reasoning was founded not on ideals that directly contradict Founding principles, but on 
an elaboration of them. 
  Gouvenor Morris, as well as James Madison advocated for a robust economy to 
aid the propertyless in their own prosperity. While they advocated for an undeniably 
limited government they also stated that it was the government’s obligation to provide a 
strong economy for prosperity and independent economic progress. Indeed, property 
ownership was seen as the means to achieve economic success and also, political and 
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economic independence which was imperative for a democratic republic. Since property 
ownership was so integral to that fulfillment and the government was charged, from its 
inception to provide for welfare and prosperity and a vigorous economy, political elites, 
in the wake of devastating depression, sought other means to fulfill those Founding goals. 
Housing Initiatives in the Wake of the Great Depression  
 During the Great Depression, public sentiment indicated society’s need to shift 
political approaches regarding economic practices. As mentioned earlier, due to 
property’s intrinsic role in the economy, a shift in economic practices almost certainly 
results in a change in the usage or protection of private property as well. The Courts 
allowed the government to enact legislation that in some aspects would violate private 
property for some for the cause of promoting the public good. Wider spread property 
ownership, as per judicial review, as well as philosophical political thought is considered 
good for society’s evolution. Ownership, as has been stated, establishes independence 
and thus makes for better citizens, in some cases, ideal citizens. Property ownership, 
particularly, owning a home, became a demarcation of upward economic mobility, and 
constituted the achievement of the “American Dream.” Given the privileges awarded to 
property owners as well as the Founding ideology that idealizes a society of independent 
property owners, it was clear that through the American Tradition, that property 
ownership was an imperative in what it means to be an American.160  
 The allowance of government to impede upon private property rights for the 
public good, its obligatory commitment to ensure a thriving economy for posterity, the 
courts’ deference to the legislature to legislate as it see fit to fulfill those goals, and the 
focus on homeownership by the American public, culminated in housing initiatives 
starting in the 1930s that created the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
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Mae)  in 1938 and the Community Reinvestment Act that caused the housing bubble and 
ensuing financial crisis.161  
 The National Housing Act of 1934 was enacted by Congress as a part of the New 
Deal. In it was created the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), and the United States Housing Authority (USHA). 
FSLIC provided deposit insurance for savings and loans institutions and USHA was 
created to lend money to areas for low-cost construction generally for low income 
members of society. The most notable contribution of the 1934 Act was the creation of 
the FHA which set the standards for home construction, the standards for underwriting 
loans, as well as their insurance for home purchasing. The FHA insured lenders against 
the risk of defaults on single-family homes and provided middle income families with 
credit so that they could buy homes with larger loans at affordable interest rates.162  
The FHA would take half of a percentage off of standard interest rates that were 
paid to lenders and that cost was repaid by borrowers through fees or other terms that 
were built into the mortgage contract. The funding received would go into a reserve fund 
which was held by the FHA and used to protect lenders in the case of loan defaults. 
Additionally, the federal government guaranteed the reserve fund in the case of a 
shortage, therefore, lenders that qualified for insurance under FHA standards faced no 
risk in lending. The FHA, however, retained the ability to dictate the standards of 
qualifications for the loans that were issued. These standards, however, often resulted in 
what is called “redlining,” a series of racially biased standards that favored White 
borrowers over minority borrowers, who were hindered from acquiring long-term 
amortized mortgages.163  This practice contributed significantly to the segregation of 
neighborhoods, which was hallmarked by the unequal construction of homes. Indeed, one 
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of the goals of the Civil Rights movement was to achieve equal and equitable housing for 
African Americans. In response to the redlining and the decaying neighborhoods and 
blatant racism, the government enacted two Acts to increase transparency in federal 
lending practices: The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975) and more significantly the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977.164   
 When examining the housing bubble, it is clear that the lending practices 
entertained by lenders resulted in the increase in subprime mortgages which, when they 
defaulted  in the short amount of time that they did, caused a precipitous fall in housing 
prices and devastation  to the economy that resulted in an economic recession and global 
financial crisis. Government sponsorship and policy goals as well as encouragement, and 
in many cases, outright mandates for loan issuances to subprime borrowers caused this 
crisis, and the roots of the political arguments made for the increase in homeownership 
are derived directly from the American Founding.  
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Chapter 5: Government Policies, the Bubble, and the Burst 
 
“It means we use the mighty muscle of the federal government in combination with state 
and local governments to encourage owning your own home.”    
   —President George W. Bush, Atlanta, Georgia, May 17, 2002165  
 
There are different arguments for how and why the housing bubble and ensuing 
crisis occurred.166 Factors ranging from monetary policy, to financial constructions, to 
securitization and the government’s adaptation of international policies have been posed, 
however, the root of the housing bubble was subprime lending, and those lending 
practices originated with the polices of the government sponsored entities and the 
demands from the Community Reinvestment Act.  The ongoing political ideology of 
widespread property ownership drove the creation of these public polices which caused 
devastating effects on the national and global economy. 
While many economists and analysts alike try to interpret the source of the Crisis 
as a failure of capitalism, what many seem to either forget or ignore is the fact that 
capitalism is construed and restrained by the government. Even Laissez-Faire economics 
constitutes minimal governmental authority. The economy is guided by policy restraints, 
allowing and disallowing certain practices. Thus, economic travesties, such as the most 
recent one, are a direct result of governmental influence.   
Political initiatives are typically driven by ideology. Acts of Congress are vehicles 
for perpetuating these ideologies and serve as the legal manifestations of philosophical 
thought. When examining the roots of particular pieces of legislation, it is imperative to 
note their roots in American ideals and understand how they serve as the means to reach 
those ideals.  
The creation of The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and 
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) as well as the 
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establishment and later amending of the Community Reinvestment Act are direct results 
of a longstanding American ideology that advocates for widespread property ownership 
as well as the equitable pursuit of property ownership. These two governmental actions 
are direct manifestations of Jefferson’s vision of a society of independent property 
owners albeit without the agrarian aspect, as well as Madison’s belief that the right to 
pursue the acquisition of property be readily protect by the government. Jefferson, 
Madison, and Morris probably could not conceive the mechanics of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac or those of the Community Reinvestment Act, however, the sentiments 
surrounding these government initiatives is something that the Framers would have 
supported. The only caveat would have been that the Framers would only have supported 
these interventions for the sake of promoting equity in pursuit, not equity in outcome, 
which is what actually occurred.  
The Community Reinvestment Act  
“It affirms that federally insured banks and thrifts have an obligation to help meet the 
credit needs of the entire communities they serve, including low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods, in a safe and sound manner.” 
—Sandra Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs167  
The Community Reinvestment Act was enacted in 1977 and was designed to 
mandate that regulators determine if a federally insured bank  was serving the needs of its 
entire community in the wake of racially discriminatory practices known as “redlining.” 
168 Any determination that banks were not serving the needs of the community meant the 
denial of applications for mergers and acquisitions from those banks. Thus, in order for a 
bank to progress and grow, it needed to demonstrate adequate community service.169  
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For decades, however, the specifications of “serving the community” were vague 
and hardly ever enforced, or indeed, unenforceable due to the lack of any given criteria in 
the Act, save for the mentioning that banks had to serve their communities utilizing “safe 
and sound” lending practices.170 In the wake of a study published in 1994 that appeared to 
indicate the continuance of racially discriminatory practices, President Clinton launched 
his National Homeownership Strategy led by HUD, which entailed the lowering of 
underwriting standards and explicitly called for new “financing strategies, fueled by the 
creativity and resources of the private and public sectors, to help homeowners that lack 
cash to buy a home or to make the payments.” 171172 Additionally, the President also 
called for amendments to be made to the CRA to reflect growing sentiments of the public 
as well as the political elite.173  
 By 1997, the new amendments were in full effect and worked to establish 
concrete criteria in order to determine banks’ efficacy in meeting the needs of the 
community and fulfilling CRA requirements. The new amendments took much of the 
evaluation obligations away from bank examiners and were reverted to systematic data 
analysis of whether very low-, low-, and moderate- income borrowers were being 
properly served. The new performance based assessments were thought of as a “shift of 
emphasis from procedural equity to equity in outcome.” 174  
 According to A.K.M. Rezaul Hossain, it was no longer, “sufficient for lenders to 
provide elaborate community lending efforts directed towards borrowers in the 
community,” instead they needed to prove that they had “an evenhanded distribution of 
loans across LMI and non-LMI areas and borrowers.”175176 It was now imperative that 
banks make the required loans rather than just show that they were trying to aid subprime 
borrowers. To help banks in the fulfillment of these goals, one of the new CRA standards 
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was to utilize “innovative or flexible” lending practices to address the credit needs of 
LMI borrowers. The vague nature of what was to constitute “innovate or flexible” was 
purposeful. According to Sandra Braunstein, “Neither the statute nor the agencies’ 
regulation specifies how depository institutions are to fulfill their obligation to meet the 
credit needs in the communities they serve.”177 The government left it to the individual 
institutions to best decide what practices would work best for them, however, due to the 
fact that banks were essentially mandated to supply credit to lower income borrowers, it 
was almost ensured that their innovations would include some sort of relaxed standards 
of creditworthiness. To that effect, these new innovations and flexibilities directly 
resulted in relaxed lending standards, in spite of the “safe and sound” provisions of the 
original Act. Here, the government had a direct hand in the molding of the economic 
practices of financial institutions.  
 The most important and most perpetual consequence of the CRA amendments 
was the new, lower standards used in underwriting mortgages so that more people, 
particularly subprime borrowers, could own homes.  These lower standards became the 
new standards for which commercial banks issued loans and the government 
encouragement and mandates made them commonplace lending practices that spread to 
the prime markets where loans were issued by lenders other than insured banks. In the 
time between 1995 and 2005, homeownership grew from 64 percent, where it had been 
for roughly 25 years, to 69 percent, the highest it has ever been, and with it came a vast 
increase in subprime lending practices.178  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
“I do believe in the American Dream. I believe there is such a thing as the American 
Dream. And I believe those of us who have been given positions of responsibility must do 
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everything we can to spotlight the dream and to make sure the dream shines in all 
neighborhoods, all throughout our country. Owning a home is a part of that dream, it 
just is. Right here in America if you own your own home, you're realizing the American 
Dream.” 
— President George W. Bush, Atlanta, Georgia, May 17, 2002, Introducing the new 
initiatives for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae179 
 As a part of the New Deal Program, President Franklin Roosevelt established 
Fannie Mae due to the lack of a national housing market. Before this point, Savings and 
Loans Associations (S&L), the primary issuers of mortgages, were not allowed to expand 
across state lines and thus, there was no national housing market to spread risk across. 
Additionally, due to the fact that the Great Depression was a crisis of credit, President 
Roosevelt created Fannie Mae, a government-sponsored entity to compensate for those 
deficiencies.180 In 1968, private stockholders were allowed to buy stocks in Fannie Mae 
in efforts for the government to move the GSE off of its books due to its overburdened 
budgetary spending on the Vietnam War and entitlement programs. In order to move the 
expenditures off the federal budget, Fannie Mae was essentially semi-privatized. In 1970, 
Freddie Mac was established in order to expand the secondary housing market to further 
the government’s initiatives for wider spread homeownership.  
 The function of these two GSEs was integral in the creation of the housing bubble 
and subsequent collapse. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not themselves lend money to 
homebuyers for mortgages, however, when a bank or S&L did so, Fannie and Freddie 
would buy that loan from the originator, thus giving the bank its money back, which 
subsequently allowed it to make more loans. Occasionally, the GSEs would keep the 
mortgages that they had bought, meaning that the fees, interests, and principle payments 
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on the mortgages would be received by them, but most of the time, they would package 
the mortgage loans, sometimes with other types of loans such as auto loans and student 
loans, and sell these pools to institutional investors. This subsequently gave Fannie and 
Freddie back their money to purchase more loans from mortgage originators. When the 
GSEs sold these packages to investors, they guaranteed that they would pay both the 
interest and mortgage payments if the original buyer could not. For this insurance, Fannie 
and Freddie charged a fee, $100 for every $1 million in mortgages, from which they 
profited immensely.181 These pools that Freddie and Fannie issued are the now infamous 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  
In 1994 the Department of Housing and Urban Development set a requirement 
stating that 30 percent of all GSE mortgage purchases had to be of the affordable-housing 
variety.  The next year, Henry Cisneros, President Clinton’s Housing Secretary, set a new 
target for the GSEs: at least 42 percent of all mortgages that Fannie and Freddie traded 
had to be from low- and moderate-incomes households.182 Due to that mandate, Fannie 
Mae introduced a 3 percent down payment mortgage in 1997. Traditionally, the GSE 
mortgages had required a 20 percent down payment, however, since large down 
payments were one of the primary hurdles for moderate- and low-income homebuyers, 
the requirements for down payments were lowered in order to make mortgages more 
accessible.  
In 1994, a HUD-sponsored study found that GSE guidelines were more likely to 
disqualify low-income borrowers as well as borrowers with poor credit history. This was 
probably due to the fact that those individuals were considered risky borrowers with 
higher potentials to default on their loans. Low-income borrowers are typically people 
who not only have lower annual incomes and personal wealth, but also those who 
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probably have lower savings. This means that if a low-income borrower were to lose his 
job, his savings might not be enough to cover his mortgage along with other expenses, 
forcing the mortgager to eventually default. Credit scores are an amalgamation of an 
individual’s many financial characteristics including, but not limited to: income, job 
stability, and repayment of previous debts (such as credit card debt). Any of these 
variables can both impact and signal the likelihood of defaulting. If an individual has 
relative job instability, there is an obvious likelihood that he or she may not be able to 
pay monthly mortgage payments. If a person also exhibits the propensity for allowing 
credit card debt to build up and refrain from paying off debts (due to lack of funds or any 
other circumstance), there is also the chance that he or she might not be able to pay off a 
mortgage. Thus, individuals with low-income and poor credit history were considered too 
risky to lend to.  
The findings of the 1994 study were interpreted as racially discriminatory due to 
that fact that borrowers with low-incomes, poor credit histories, and limited wealth 
tended to disproportionately belonged to minority groups. In the same study, HUD found 
that other lenders were seen to have served low-income borrowers (due to the new CRA 
mandates, to be discussed later) better than the GSEs did. As per the new government 
imposed mandates, this was considered wholly unacceptable. Thus, Freddie and Fannie 
were forced to revise their strategies and began to buy loans issued to borrowers who 
held characteristics they would have, and previously had, rejected.  
 These new practices laid the foundation for accepting an increasing amount of 
“subprime” and “nontraditional” mortgages.183 In the year the study was conducted, HUD 
found that Fannie Mae purchased mortgages with 97 LTVs, and by 2001, it was 
purchasing mortgages with LTVs of 100, meaning there were no down payments taken 
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on those mortgages at the time of origination. By 2007, the GSEs were required to show 
that 55 percent of their purchased mortgages were low to moderate income mortgages 
and that 38 percent of those needed to come from areas that were previously underserved, 
typically inner cities or urban fringe areas. Twenty-five percent of those loans were 
mandated to be from low to very-low income borrowers.  From 2006-2007, Fannie and 
Freddie purchased roughly $1 trillion in subprime and Alt-A loans which constituted 
roughly 40 percent of their total mortgage purchases. 184  As is apparent, from the 13 year 
span between 1994 and 2007, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the goals of the 
Presidential administrations and HUD with creditworthiness.  
 Fannie and Freddie were integral in the transmission of lower lending practices in 
the prime market. The GSEs’ holdings of these subprime loans affected the rest of the 
market for these mortgages by increasing the competition for the loans with private-label 
issuers. Before 2004, the financial advantages that the GSEs held, due to their quasi-
governmental statuses which gave them access to cheaper financing, allowed them to 
monopolize the market that was conforming around these new securities. When the 
GSE’s were given new directives to increase their purchasing of subprime loans, they 
created a higher demand for those loans which also drove up their value, reducing their 
risk premiums which had previously suppressed subprime origination and securitization. 
Due to the increase in purchasing, and the continuation of subprime lending to meet the 
demand for loans by the GSEs, more loans were issued to increasingly subprime 
borrowers. Banks and other private originator lenders such as the now-infamous and 
failed institution, Countrywide Financial, issued subprime loans and those loans were 
then pooled and bought as MBS not only by GSEs but also by private firms, such as Bear 
Stearns. 185186  In the three year period from 2003 to 2006, conventional loans declined 
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from 78.8 percent to 59.1 percent while the subprime and Alt-A loans increased from 
10.1 to 32.7 percent of all mortgages issued. 187188  
 The GSE regulation-induced competition with the private-label issuers had an 
identical effect on the quality of mortgages that the private-label issuers were 
securitizing. The competition from Freddie and Fannie, beginning in 2004, caused both 
the GSEs and the private issuers to “bottom feed” in terms of mortgage issuances. The 
devolution of lending standards that were instigated with the GSEs due to their directives 
to meet Congress’ goals of widespread homeownership became the new norms for 
lending in the market.  
It was clear that in the time leading up to the Crisis, and indeed, through and 
beyond it, the practices of limited government had eroded and in order to fulfill 
ideological objectives. The government interjected, threatening banks with penalties such 
as fines but also with denials for their own economic growth.189 This type of intervention, 
it would seem, goes against the Founding ideals of Jefferson, Madison, and Morris, who 
espoused, in almost definitive terms, the restraint of government. Jefferson, however, was 
of two beliefs. One, that he believed in limited government, but also, that the ideal 
American society was to be made up of independent property owners, and that it should 
be the government’s job, in practice, to ensure this as much as possible.190 Madison and 
Morris were in agreement with Jefferson’s former belief and additionally believed that 
the right to acquire property was at the core in protecting property rights. In the instances 
of both the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the establishment of the 
CRA and its amendments, the manifestations of these Founding ideals directly impacted 
the risk- taking behavior of financial institutions, and those resulting actions, 
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consequences of ideologically driven policies, caused a housing bubble that imploded, 
and brought down the rest of the American economy with it.  
From a Housing Bubble to a Financial Crisis 
 
Housing Bubble 
 
The origins of the housing bubble lay on the foundations of speculation and credit 
that flooded the market from the 1990s to the late-2000s. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 
played an integral role in the inflation of housing prices by creating high demands for 
lower lending standards which increased the population of homebuyers. The CRA 
amendments perpetuated goals of wider spread homeownership which meant that more 
people were allowed access to credit in order to purchase homes, adding to the increased 
amount of people who were eligible for property ownership.  
 Housing is a unique good. Its supply is difficult to manufacture quickly given the 
inputs required for home construction, which results in a lag in the supply of homes to 
meet the demand. The increase in credit and influx of viable homebuyers in the market 
caused demand for homes to far outstrip its supply, driving up the prices of homes (see 
Figure 2 where demand increases from D1 to D2 causing prices to increase from P1 to P2). 
The more buyers there are in a given market, the higher the prices, and thus, the larger the 
bubble grows. This also means that when the bubble deflates, the harder and faster prices 
fall. Looking at Figures 2 and 3, when demand increases for a good, for example, 
housing, in a basic supply and demand model, prices will increase for that good. Due to 
the increase in demand, suppliers, that is housing contractors and builders, will increase 
their production to meet the increase in demand, resulting in an increased shift in supply. 
This shift, as seen in Figure 3, will result in a decrease in prices once again. The higher 
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and faster prices climb due to increased demand which in turn is driven by an increase in 
credit as well as speculation, the farther they fall due to the rapid increase in supply.   
Figure 2   
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Figure 4 shows housing prices from 1990 to 2014. The shaded area on the graph, 
from 2007 to 2009 indicates an economic recession. The Federal Reserve Bank reported 
that the median housing prices in that time dropped from $249,100 in November 2007 to 
$222,300 in May 2009.191   
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Figure 4 
 
 
In the mortgage market, the institutions that originate mortgages are private sector 
lenders which include commercial banks and mortgage brokers. As mentioned earlier, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased loans issued by the lenders, thus freeing up the 
originator’s assets so that it could issue more loans. Fannie and Freddie then packaged 
and sold these mortgages in the secondary market as securities. The GSEs, however, were 
not the only ones to engage in these securitization practices. Private investment banks 
also partook in the securitization, and sold shares of the future principle and interest 
payments to investors, both domestic and international. While GSEs pioneered the prime-
mortgage securitization model, investment banks extended those models to other, riskier, 
assets, most notably subprime mortgages.192 When the bubble collapsed in 2008, 41 
percent of all mortgages were held by GSEs and the other 59 percent were held by 
commercial banks of origin or private investment firms in the form of MBS.193 
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Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
The issuance of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) further made MBS risky 
investments. Following the burst of the tech bubble in the early 2000s, the Federal 
Reserve lowered interest rates in the hopes of avoiding deflation and kept them 
suppressed for the following five years. Prime rates soon followed and dropped from 
roughly 8 percent to 5.25 percent and fluctuated from 5.25 to 6 percent, the lowest they 
had been since the end of World War II, until 2007. While these rates contributed greatly 
to the increase in demand in the housing market by making borrowing and paying back 
loans cheaper, they would have to increase again at some point. Mortgages, however, are 
issued typically on a 15-year or 30-year contractual basis, thus if interest rates increased 
in that time, the bank of issuance stood to lose profit and that could easily lead to 
insolvency. This occurred due to the fact the if the federal funds rate, the rate that banks 
lend to each other, increased but interest rates were locked, the bank would then have to 
pay its depositors as well as borrow money at a higher rate than it was receiving from its 
mortgages . Banks would then have to borrow money and risk insolvency. To combat 
those possibilities, the adjustable rate mortgage was created.  
Starting in 2004, ARMs were issued with low two or three year “teaser rates” that 
compensated the borrower for assuming the responsibility of paying higher interest rates 
in the future if needed. In practicality, however, borrowers who held ARMs were 
generally unaware of the potential increase in interest rates, and when the interest rate 
finally did increase, many were forced to default due to rapidly rising monthly 
payments.194 Additionally, teaser rates could be extended if the mortgage loans was re-
financed at similar rates, as long as housing prices were increasing, which for nearly a 
decade, they were.  
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Mortgages tend to be the largest financial asset and liability of any household, 
with a home sometimes representing 35 percent of a household’s total wealth. This makes 
households particularly sensitive to changes in monthly payments, since a large part of 
their annual incomes are dedicated to paying off their mortgage. Also, given the fact that 
most ARMs were issued to moderate-, low-, and very low-income borrowers, household 
that are not typically able to save much of their after-tax incomes, and they could not 
afford much fluctuation in their monthly payments, so when the interest rates on homes 
inevitably rose again, those homeowners had no choice but to default on their loans.195   
 Securitization  
 Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brother were two large issuers of private label 
mortgage-backed securities. Similar to the securities issued by the GSEs, PLMBS were 
distinct from agency MBS due to the latter’s governmental guarantee. PLMBS, however, 
did not have any such guarantee, and thus, their risk evaluations were based on the 
determinations made by ratings agencies, otherwise known was the Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Organizations (NRSROs).196  
As noted earlier, the agency MBS were given the backing of the federal 
government, therefore, these bonds were guaranteed to their holders. The PLMBS, 
however, were given ratings by the now notorious Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and 
Fitch. These rating agencies, while renowned for their storied histories in the financial 
sector, were highly inaccurate in recent context for a variety of reasons. For the decades 
leading up to the crash, the three NRSROs failed to update their statistical models of the 
housing market, and indeed, never in any of their calculations, incorporated a scenario 
where there would be a national decrease in housing prices. The failure to incorporate 
any new scenarios or findings stems from a history of complacency at the agencies.197 
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In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission granted the three firms 
government-protected oligopoly status, making it illegal for many government sponsored 
funds to use ratings from other sources, essentially making it impossible for any other 
firms to compete with the NRSROs. This led to a culture of complacency in the three 
agencies. Due to their storied histories of accuracy, everyone, from federal government 
officials to investors, took the ratings as nothing less than accurate. Thus, when the 
agencies rated subprime MBS as AAA (the highest possible rating), institutions invested 
in droves. In fact, at the time of the bubble burst, 80 percent of the MBS sold held ratings 
of AAA. 
Why, then, was there widespread failure of financial institutions and freezing up 
of capital markets? If bad mortgages sold to investors were all there was to it, the 
deflation of the housing bubble would not have been any different than the crash of the 
tech bubble in the early 2000s, meaning, it would have been self-contained to that 
industry. Due to securitization, risk was heavily concentrated on banks, both commercial 
and investment, and even insurance companies that had purchased AAA rated MBS.198  
Due to the United States adoption of international rules, securitization was an 
easy work around for capital requirements. 199 Securitization permits banks to use less 
capital by allowing them to be underwriters for mortgages while also retaining their roles 
as originators. As mentioned before, the selling of mortgages by originating banks freed 
up their reserves to make more loans. They would also, however, repurchase the loans 
they had originated after they were securitized or they would purchase securities that 
were originated by other banks.  Commercial banks were required to hold less capital for 
the MBS they acquired than for the mortgages they held, so even though they issued 
extensive amounts of mortgages, they were allowed to hold less than half the capital they 
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otherwise would have been required to due to securitization. This severely changed the 
very nature of banking. Now, bankers acted as intermediaries between investors and 
borrowers, rather than just depositors and borrowers as they previously had.200   
Starting at the end of 2002, investment banks applied the same securitization 
model that the GSEs had established with prime mortgages to subprime mortgages. This 
allowed commercial banks to transfer their risk from their own institutions onto the 
market at large in the form of PLMBS.201  
 When the interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages finally began their rise in 
2006 and 2007, mortgagers began to default at higher-than-expected rates. Due to the fact 
that a vast majority of ARMs had been issued at around the same time, their interest rates 
began resetting at the same time as well, and by extension, subprime mortgagers began to 
default simultaneously.202 When these borrowers began to default on these loans, the 
values of their homes declined at a rapid pace, and the bubble began its deflation.  
It soon became clear that the mortgages that backed the securities that were traded 
so vastly and numerously were toxic, and that the AAA ratings were misleading 
regarding their risk. Investors began divesting from portfolios and institutions that were 
thought to have large holdings of MBS and stocks in many of the investment banks began 
to plummet.   
On September 6, 2008, the government rescued Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as 
was expected due to their quasi-governmental status. Due to the government’s guarantee 
of securities the GSEs issued, it alleviated one of the most potentially destructive risks of 
the collapse of the housing bubble: that commercial banks would collapse due to their 
holding of $854 billion in agency MBS. Freddie and Fannie were “bailed out,” however, 
private investment banks were not as fortunate, at least not initially. Countrywide 
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Finance, for example, was sold to Bank of America for two dollars a share. Lehman 
Brothers, however, the most infamous of all investment firms, was left to collapse. Its 
folding exacerbated the markets to the point where other investment banks, insurance 
firms such as the American International Group (AIG), and businesses small and large 
alike faced economic hardships, bringing some to the brink of bankruptcy or insolvency.  
In the week following the GSE bailout, interbank lending, upon which investment 
banks rely heavily, nearly stopped.203 This decline was not due to a lack of liquidity, 
indeed, banks had the cash on hand to loan to each other. It was due to the lack of faith 
that each bank had in the others’ ability to pay back any loans dispensed. This uncertainty 
stemmed from a lack of information on who was holding subprime mortgages and how 
toxic those securities would end up being once the market stabilized. The fear of mutual 
insolvency led to a crisis of lending. Lehman Brothers was one of the largest private 
securitizers of subprime mortgages and without the interbank loans, Lehman Brothers 
eventually filed for bankruptcy.204  
 In the week following Lehman’s collapse, interbank lending froze everywhere, 
even amongst commercial banks. By fearing the solvency of each other, they needed to 
fear for their own solvencies as well. Commercial banks had invested largely in the 
subprime securities that the investment banks had securitized, in fact, in April 2008, just 
five months before the collapse of Freddie, Fannie, and Lehman, American commercial 
banks were the single largest purchasers of MBS. Due to the fact that the MBS were 
devaluating at a rapid pace, and there was a large deficit of information about their worth 
and toxicity, banks had no choice but to hold onto their cash in the event there was a run 
on their banks and they needed pay depositors.205   
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Commercial banks serve an integral role in the economy. These institutions are 
charged with lending to not only homebuyers, but also to consumers and businesses of all 
types of goods. Commercial banks thus have an immense impact in the “real economy” 
especially when compared to their investment bank counterparts, who primarily are 
charged with investments, but are not responsible for financing consumer credit, or loans 
for student education, automobiles, or businesses. Thus, when commercial banks 
contracted their lending, it affected the economy on a larger scale. Businesses were 
unable to take out loans, many homeowners lost their homes, or struggled to pay their 
mortgages at higher rates than they previously had to. Thus they had less money to spend 
on other goods, and due to the contraction in business, many firms were forced to lay off 
their personnel, causing unemployment to increase and also further contributed to the 
economic downturn. The fact that commercial banks held such a vast amount of MBS 
that were backed by subprime mortgages that defaulted caused the housing bubble to turn 
into a financial crisis that detrimentally affected the rest of the economy.206  
The contraction of lending, however, was not unique to the United States. 
International commercial banks made up half of the PLMBS purchases, and the decline in 
the worth of those securities forced banks to halt their own lending to their own 
communities, all at once, all over the world.207  
Credit Default Swaps and the American International Group 
To be sure, investors were not wholly ignorant of the risk involved with the 
securities they were so heavily investing in. While they may not have had complete 
knowledge of the subprime mortgages or the fragile nature of the bubble, whenever there 
is any type of risk, most investors, indeed, the prudent ones, often took out insurance on 
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their investments. One of the most common forms of insurance during the housing bubble 
was credit default swap (CDS).208  
 A CDS is contract in which one party, the protection seller, agrees to reimburse 
another party, the protection buyer, against the default of a financial obligation by a third 
party, often called the reference entity or the issuer of the bond. What happens in a CDS 
is essentially a shifting of risk from one party to another.209  
 In the instance of MBS and CDS, investment banks and private entities alike 
would purchase mortgage-backed securities. In order to offset risk, these entities would 
then purchase insurance in the form of credit-default swaps on the chance that the 
underlying collateral on the MBS would default, i.e. the mortgages. The insurance 
provider, the seller of the CDS, would ensure that if the MBS valuation decreased, it 
would pay the purchaser of the insurance the amount previously agreed upon. In the 
meantime, the protection buyer would pay a premium to the protection seller. One of the 
largest issuers of CDS was AIG.210  
 AIG fell to the brink of failure in the week following the demise of Lehman 
Brothers. AIG’s models that assessed credit-risk inadequately accounted for the risk in 
MBS as well the possibilities for a decline in the mortgage market and a downgrade in its 
credit-rating from the NRSROs. Due to the fact that AIG’s risk was rated AAA, the 
counterparties in AIG’s CDS did not posit the need for AIG to post collateral to prove it 
could make good on its obligations. When its rating was suddenly downgraded, it was 
then obligated to post collateral—collateral that it did not possess. Additionally, due to 
the fact AIG had written protection on MBS, when they declined in valuation, AIG was 
forced to post collateral for its newly exposed risk as well. These two conditions 
combined, AIG was unable to post the newly demanded collateral, and was forced to the 
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brink of bankruptcy. At that point, due to the fragility of the markets following the 
collapse of Lehman, the trepidation surrounding other investment banks, and the 
insurance that AIG provided for millions of businesses outside of the financial industry, 
the Federal Reserve stepped in to bail out AIG.211  
 The Bailout  
In the wake of Lehman Brothers and AIG, the Department of the Treasury 
announced that it would assemble and propose a rescue package aimed at eliminating the 
risk that commercial and investment banks held concerning the so-called “toxic” 
mortgage securities.212 On September 23, 2008, Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, and Henry Paulsen, the Treasury Secretary, testified to the Senate 
Banking Committee stating their proposal would require a $700 billion allowance to 
purchase assets and equity to alleviate the stress on the financial industry and 
subsequently strengthen it. On October 3, 2008, President Bush signed the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).213  
 The stipulations of TARP were that the Treasury Department was to purchase any 
assets backed by mortgages that were deemed “toxic” and issued before March 14, 2008. 
The purchasing included illiquid assets whose values were difficult to assess and the 
program itself was aimed at putting liquidity back into the market. This liquidity injection 
was instigated in the hopes that banks would increase their lending to the market at large 
as well as to each other.214  
 TARP was famously written and proposed on a two-and-a-half page document, 
and did not propose any oversight regulations. To that effect, the fears of moral hazard 
were raised. Indeed, many banks did not, in fact, increase their lending practices in the 
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private sector as had been hoped. Banks’ uncertainty in private sector borrowers to be 
able to pay back potential loans curbed them from issuing any such loans.215  
 Conclusion  
In conclusion, in order to fulfil ideologically fueled policy goals, the federal 
government created Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to make mortgage lending more 
appealing to commercial banks and other mortgage originators. In order to do so, Fannie 
and Freddie pioneered a model of securitization that was later adopted in the private 
sector among investment banks and other entities that securitized subprime mortgages. 
Additionally, amendments to the Community Reinvestment Act created financial 
consequences for banks that were not seen as fulfilling the public policy goals of serving 
low- and moderate-income borrowers and by using the force of the government, directly 
intervened in economic activities to perpetuate ideological goals.  
The subprime lending practices instigated by the GSEs as well as the CRA 
amendments had a direct effect on the housing market. Both the CRA amendments and 
the GSEs put pressure on lenders to increase the rate of homeownership in the nation by 
giving subprime borrowers access to credit. This increased the number of homebuyers 
and thus, increased the demand in homes which then forced housing prices to rise. Due to 
this rapid rise speculation increased that home prices would continue their rise and the 
mortgages upon which securities were backed were seen as sound investments. Rating 
agencies echoed those sentiments by providing the highest possible ratings to MBS.  
Insurance taken out on MBS in the form of credit-default swaps then transferred 
risks from investment banks to other entities, most notably AIG, and when finally, the 
interest rates on the adjustable-rate mortgages began to reset, subprime mortgagers began 
to default, at unprecedented rates and quantities, all at once, rapidly devaluating MBS, 
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causing housing prices to free-fall, and due to expenditures issued in the forms of loans, 
the sudden lack of payment on those debts, commercial banks, GSEs, and private 
investors alike began losing money pressing some to insolvency and other still, to forced 
government takeovers and bail outs.   
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Chapter 6: Where Do We Go From Here 
  
Nearly ten years after the beginning of the collapse of the housing bubble, it is 
clear there has been a paradigm shift in the national political economy. This shift will 
undoubtedly affect governance as well as economic practices for decades to come. While 
most economists will agree that, at the point of this writing, the economy is recovering, 
the Great Recession will remain stark in the national memory for years to come.  
 The housing initiatives that were promoted in the 1990s and 2000s have, 
paradoxically, hurt the people that the government initially set out to help. Subprime 
borrowers, the targets of the CRA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac programs defaulted in 
the mid- to late- 2000s on their mortgages, resulting in many of those borrowers losing 
their homes. Homeownership rates for African Americans and Hispanics show that 
minorities have disproportionately lost their homes when compared to their White 
counterparts.216 Retrospectively, what these government initiatives did was disadvantage 
many of the citizens that they originally sought to help, and worse yet, it all could have 
been avoided, had the government refrained from setting initiatives that compelled banks 
to issue riskier mortgages. The fact that the government looked to aid all citizens in their 
pursuit of the American Dream led, in fact, to the demolition of it for many thousands of 
people, not just in the form of homeownership losses, but also in unemployment and 
economic stress as well.217  
Looking forward, what needs to happen is a return to more responsible lending 
practices. There is a reason why low-income and moderate-income level borrowers were 
not receiving home loans from commercial banks. If these borrowers were considered 
safe risks to take, then banks would have taken them. As mentioned earlier, mortgages 
are bank assets, meaning that banks make profits off of them. Due to the CRA banks 
	  88 
	  
were forced to lend to people that they would not have otherwise given loans to. But 
there was a reason for that, they were risky borrowers, and the banks were aware of that, 
but the government incentivized these subprime loans to the point that it became a 
necessity to make them.  
It was bad public policy and even worse publicity, however, and it looked as 
though a disproportionate amount of people were being systemically barred from 
achieving the American Dream. Those people also happened to belong to a group that  
was systemically discriminated against throughout American history. The public outcry 
leading up to these initiatives was strong, and the government, due to ideology and public 
pressure, needed to step in and remedy the fact that homeownership rates were not equal 
amongst all people. What ended up happening was the economic devastation that has 
been discussed at length in this thesis.  
What needs to occur now are more responsible lending practices, a retreat back to 
the “traditional mortgages” where borrowers are asked to provide a 20 percent down 
payment and fulfill a long-term mortgage contract. Perhaps what is needed is a shift in 
the length of how long the mortgage contract is. While it is hard to imagine a contract 
longer than 30 years, perhaps that is an avenue that banks need to explore. We also need 
to make sure that borrowers are made well aware of the contracts that they engage in. We 
need a shift back to responsible lending, but also a shift towards responsible borrowing.  
 In addition to the logistical practices of the financial sector, a larger, more 
profound change needs to occur within the American psyche.  What needs to follow is a 
shift in the idea of what an achievement of the “American Dream” entails. Striving for 
upward social mobility is a noble goal, indeed, it is natural to want to better one’s 
position, particularly financially. What needs to change, however, is how society 
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qualifies that upward mobility. Instead of homeownership, or any other sort of material 
possession, we as a culture need to find different ways to denote an achievement of the 
Dream and what it truly means to be an American.  
 Education is in many ways, the best vehicle for upward social mobility. Higher 
education leads to higher wages and quality of life, and indeed, if we are ever to truly 
achieve Jefferson’s ideal society of independent citizens and a responsible citizenry, 
perhaps we need to forfeit his requisite of property ownership and place more importance 
on the idea of independent and informed citizens. The best way to do this is by ensuring 
quality education to all members of our society, at least to the high school level, and work 
towards making universal higher education a reality.  
 One of the biggest issues with adjustable rate mortgages was the fact that there 
was a vast knowledge deficit regarding the mortgages, their terms, and financial 
management in general. If we are to demand that members of our society engage in 
homeownership, and instill the idea of homeownership as an imperative aspect of 
belonging to this society, then we are also duly charged with educating our population 
about what the responsibilities of those ideals entail. You should not have to have a 
degree in economics or finance to be able to interact with a bank and takeout a mortgage. 
What every person has a right to regarding life, liberty, and their own pursuits of 
happiness, is a government that ensures an education to supplement those goals. There 
are certainly other means of accomplishing upward social mobility other than 
homeownership, but education is the most feasible, given its already existing 
infrastructure and it is also the one with substantial positive externalities associated with 
it. 
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 At the very least, most students attend school part-way through high school. In 
2012, the national high school graduation rate surpassed 80 percent.218 If basic financial 
management is taught in high schools and we educate students about the economic tools 
needed to procure loans and successfully pay them back, then we are capable of 
producing generations of more responsible borrowers, and more conscientious citizens. 
We need to make education a priority, and link it as fervently to the American Identity as 
homeownership has been for past generations. 
 The United States, throughout history, has been a storied nation of opportunity. It 
has been a place where people from all over the world, hailing from all nations, can come 
and create new lives that are full of opportunities that were disallowed to them elsewhere. 
Education is a right that many are denied around the world. It should not be here, and it is 
one of the best available resources we have. It can also act as a tool, and should. 
Education should be the conduit we use to provide our youth with the tools necessary to 
achieve their own personal happiness and attain their own American Dreams. We have 
already started on this new path, with free community college for students who qualify. 
Additionally, there has been increase in loan debt from student loans which many believe 
resembles the housing bubble from a decade ago. Finally, we have the DREAM Act, an 
act that would provide education for minors living in the United States undocumented. 
All three of these instances indicate that we, as a society, now view education as an 
imperative to American life.  
  Madison was a vehement advocate for the equal protection in the faculties of 
people to own property. By creating equitable, high quality education for our posterity, 
we are further protecting the rights for the equal opportunity to exercise naturally given 
faculties. Madison offered that this would be the best way for people to obtain property. 
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Adopting this postulation to modern times, the equal opportunity in exercising faculties, 
protected and supported by universal basic education, is the best way for us to allow 
future generations to accomplish and realize their own ambitions, ownership aside.  
In the wake of the Crisis, we need to think about a new a way to achieve the American 
Dream. It simply is not good public policy nor economically feasible to continue the 
trajectory of imperative homeownership that this nation has been on. We have 
experimented with it, and it has had ruinous consequences. We need to rethink what we 
should idealize in society and quantify in the American Identity. It is imperative that we 
rethink and requalify a new American Dream.
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Appendix A 
Quarterly Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity: 1994-2014 
 
Year and         
quarter U.S. 
Non-
Hispanic 
White 
Alone 
Black 
Alone 
All 
Other 
Races\1 
Hispanic 
(of any 
race) 
1994           
1st....... 63.8 69.8 42.1 50.1 40.3 
2nd....... 63.8 69.9 41.8 46.3 41.1 
3rd....... 64.1 70.0 42.7 46.9 41.1 
4th....... 64.2 70.2 42.6 47.6 42.2 
            
1995           
1st...... 64.2 70.0 42.7 46.9 41.4 
2nd...... 64.7 70.2 42.6 47.6 42.2 
3rd...... 65.0 70.4 41.2 47.2 41.8 
4th...... 65.1 70.9 42.2 46.7 42.8 
            
1996           
1st...... 65.1 71.4 43.8 50.9 41.4 
2nd...... 65.4 71.7 43.7 50.0 43.9 
3rd...... 65.6 71.8 44.5 51.5 43.5 
4th...... 65.4 71.8 44.4 51.4 42.3 
            
1997           
1st...... 65.4 71.6 44.5 51.8 42.6 
2nd...... 65.7 72.1 44.4 52.7 43.3 
3rd...... 66.0 72.3 45.3 53.1 43.0 
4th...... 65.7 71.9 45.1 52.5 44.0 
            
1998           
1st...... 65.9 72.1 45.2 52.3 44.4 
2nd...... 66.0 72.5 44.7 53.5 43.9 
3rd...... 66.8 73.1 46.6 53.6 44.9 
4th...... 66.4 72.6 45.9 52.7 45.7 
            
1999           
1st...... 66.7 72.8 46.3 52.8 46.2 
2nd...... 66.6 73.2 45.3 53.2 44.9 
3rd...... 67.0 73.5 46.6 54.5 45.5 
4th...... 66.9 73.3 46.8 54.3 45.5 
            
2000           
1st...... 67.1 73.4 47.4 53.6 45.7 
2nd...... 67.2 73.7 46.7 54.4 45.4 
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3rd...... 67.7 74.3 46.8 53.9 46.7 
4th...... 67.5 73.9 47.8 52.4 47.5 
            
2001           
1st...... 67.5 74.0 47.5 53.9 46.1 
2nd...... 67.7 74.1 47.9 55.2 46.1 
3rd...... 68.1 74.6 47.5 54.4 48.1 
4th...... 68.0 74.4 48.1 53.2 48.8 
            
2002\r           
1st...... 67.8 74.6 48.2 53.5 46.4 
2nd...... 67.6 74.5 46.5 55.3 46.1 
3rd...... 68.0 74.9 47.3 54.0 47.1 
4th...... 68.3 75.0 47.7 55.2 48.3 
            
2003           
1st...... 68.0 75.0 47.7 55.7 46.7 
2nd...... 68.0 75.2 47.3 55.3 46.2 
3rd...... 68.4 75.7 48.0 56.2 46.1 
4th...... 68.6 75.5 49.4 56.6 47.7 
            
2004           
1st...... 68.6 75.5 49.3 58.2 47.3 
2nd...... 69.2 76.2 49.7 58.7 47.4 
3rd...... 69.0 76.1 48.4 58.6 48.7 
4th...... 69.2 76.2 49.1 58.9 48.9 
            
2005           
1st...... 69.1 76.0 48.8 59.4 49.7 
2nd...... 68.6 75.6 48.0 58.0 49.2 
3rd...... 68.8 75.7 48.1 59.9 49.1 
4th...... 69.0 76.0 48.0 60.1 50.0 
            
2006           
1st...... 68.5 75.5 47.3 59.6 49.4 
2nd...... 68.7 75.9 47.2 59.3 50.0 
3rd...... 69.0 76.0 48.6 60.6 49.7 
4th...... 68.9 76.0 48.2 60.0 49.5 
            
2007           
1st…… 68.4 75.3 48.0 58.6 50.1 
2nd….. 68.2 75.4 46.3 59.4 50.0 
3rd….. 68.2 75.3 46.7 60.1 50.1 
4th….. 67.8 74.9 47.7 58.6 48.5 
            
2008           
1st…… 67.8 75.0 47.1 58.1 48.9 
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2nd….. 68.1 75.2 47.8 58.4 49.6 
3rd…… 67.9 75.1 47.8 59.0 49.5 
4th…… 67.5 74.8 46.8 58.3 48.6 
            
2009           
1st…… 67.3 74.7 46.1 57.4 48.6 
2nd….. 67.4 74.9 46.5 57.6 48.1 
3rd….. 67.6 75.0 46.4 57.8 48.7 
4th….. 67.2 74.5 46.0 58.4 48.4 
            
2010           
1st…. 67.1 74.5 45.6 57.2 48.5 
2nd…. 66.9 74.4 46.2 55.7 47.8 
3rd…. 66.9 74.7 45.0 57.3 47.0 
4th….. 66.5 74.2 44.9 57.7 46.8 
            
2011           
1st…. 66.4 74.1 44.8 56.7 46.8 
2nd…. 65.9 73.7 44.2 56.0 46.6 
3rd…. 66.3 73.8 45.6 56.4 47.6 
4th….. 66.0 73.7 45.1 56.5 46.6 
            
2012           
1st…. 65.4 73.5 43.1 55.1 46.3 
2nd…. 65.5 73.5 43.8 55.0 46.5 
3rd…. 65.5 73.6 44.1 54.6 46.7 
4th….. 65.4 73.6 44.5 55.2 45.0 
            
2013           
1st…. 65.0 73.4 43.1 54.6 45.3 
2nd…. 65.0 73.3 42.9 54.5 45.9 
3rd…. 65.3 73.3 43.1 55.2 47.6 
4th….. 65.2 73.4 43.2 56.0 45.5 
            
2014           
1st…. 64.8 72.9 43.3 55.8 45.8 
2nd…. 64.7 72.9 43.5 54.7 45.8 
3rd…. 64.4 72.6 42.9 54.2 45.6 
4th….. 64.0 72.3 42.1 55.3 44.5 
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